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COMMENTS
CONFUSINGLY DISSIMILAR APPLICATIONS
OF TRADEMARK LAW TO VANITY
TELEPHONE NUMBERS
For an increasing number of businesses, vanity telephone numbers' are
important and effective marketing tools2 that can generate substantial
sales.3 Customers easily remember catchy words or phrases in telephone
1. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1249 (E.D.
Tenn. 1993), rev'd, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997) (defining
vanity telephone numbers). A vanity telephone number is a telephone number that al-
phabetically spells out a name or word of value to a number holder on a telephone key-
pad. See In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10
F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701-02 (1995) [hereinafter NPRM]. Vanity telephone numbers can
include several different types of mnemonics: (1) numbers that correspond to the spelling
of a product, such as "1-800-FLOWERS"; (2) numbers that correspond to letters that
spell a business name, such as "1-800-HOLIDAY"; (3) numbers that begin with "4" or
"2" and end with a product, service, or business name, such as "1-800-4-TRAVEL," and
"1-800-2-GO-WEST"; (4) numbers that only partially spell a product or company name,
such as "486-HAIR," "239-ALARM," or "222-CASH"; (5) numbers that are easily re-
membered, such as "1-800-8000"; and (6) numbers that are heavily marketed, but other-
wise lack distinctiveness, such as "1-800-325-3535," which Sheraton Inns made into a jin-
gle. See In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 2496, 2497
(1996) [hereinafter Order]; Comments of Ameritech Operating Companies, to the Notice
of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 30 (Nov. 2, 1995) (listing examples of
numbers that could be defined as vanity telephone numbers); see also Comments of Di-
rect Marketing Association, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-
155, at 4 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of Direct Marketing] (discussing the im-
portance of vanity telephone numbers to both companies and the public).
2. See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1989)
(noting the use of vanity telephone numbers as a popular marketing technique); Holiday
Inns, 838 F. Supp. at 1249 (noting that some businesses obtain vanity telephone numbers
to enhance the use of 800 numbers); Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Wilkins, 920
S.W.2d 544, 550 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that "it is common for businesses to use a
catchy word or easily remembered term in their phone numbers as a marketing tech-
nique"); NPRM, supra note 1, at 13707 ("Toll free numbers are essential to many busi-
nesses both in terms of marketing and advertising products. Toll free numbers may also
have an intrinsic value to many businesses."); Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, to the No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 3-4 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter
Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS] (claiming that its business was made possible by the use
of the 800 code, which in 1995 generated revenues exceeding $200 million); Loren
Stocker, 1-800-Mindshare: The Numbers Game, ADVERTISING AGE, July 24, 1995, at 14.
3. See Comments of Direct Marketing, supra note 1, at 4. Direct Marketing Asso-
ciation, a trade association of 3,500 direct marketing companies, estimates that the "total
sales of goods and services generated in response to direct mail marketing exceeded $350
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numbers and can bypass a telephone directory or other forms of adver-
tisement to contact a business directly.4 Because vanity telephone num-
bers are so effective, trademark disputes have resulted from several dif-
ferent practices involving the duplication or use of confusingly similar
numbers!
billion in 1994. A very substantial percentage-probably more than half-of these orders
were placed by consumers using 800 numbers." Id. The company that markets 1-800-
Mattress indicated that its sales grew by 60% per year since its acquisition of the corre-
sponding toll-free number. See Comments of Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp., to the
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 1 (Nov. 3, 1995) [hereinafter
Comments of Dial-A-Mattress].
4. See Holiday Inns, 838 F. Supp. at 1249. When consumers identify a vanity tele-
phone number with a source of a good or service, the term contained in the telephone
number may be a valid trademark. See Lanham Act § 45,15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (defin-
ing a trademark as "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others").
Some companies exist solely to obtain and resell vanity telephone numbers to other
businesses. See Comments of Vanity International, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 1 (Nov. 2, 1995) (describing itself as "the world's premier
vanity number design and consulting firm"); Joint Reply Comments of Dial 800, L.P., to
the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 1 (Nov. 20, 1995) [herein-
after Joint Reply Comments of Dial 800] (describing itself as a "small marketing and tele-
communications consulting company" specializing in the use of vanity "800" numbers).
For example, Call Management Systems, Inc., one of the defendants in Holiday Inns, was
a consulting firm that obtained and serviced "800" telephone numbers for businesses. See
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 620 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 770 (1997). Because the FCC assigns toll-free numbers on a first-come, first-
serve basis, companies such as Call Management attempt to ensure they are first in line to
gain a competitive advantage over others by reserving those telephone numbers that spell
catchy and easily remembered words. See Order, supra note 1, at 2499 (noting the first-
come, first-serve procedure); NPRM, supra note 1, at 13698 (citing Industry Guidelines
for 800 Number Administration § 2.3.1 (June 8, 1995)); see also Murrin v. Midco Commu-
nications, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (D. Minn. 1989) (discussing the first-come, first-
serve procedure as applied to common carriers).
5. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620 (involving "1-800-HOLIDAY" with the letter
"o" versus "1-800-HOLIDAY" with a zero); Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d
852, 853 (3d Cir. 1992) (comparing "INJURY-I" with "INJURY-9"); Dial-A-Mattress,
880 F.2d at 676 (comparing local area telephone number "MATTRES" with toll-free
telephone number "1-800-MATTRES"); Miss Dig Sys., Inc. v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc., 944
F. Supp. 600, 601 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (involving local area telephone number "MISS-DIG"
with toll-free telephone number "1-800-MISS-DIG"); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Kresch, 943 F.
Supp. 802, 803 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (comparing "1-800-GO-U-HAUL" versus "1-800-GO-
U-HALL" with the letter "o", "1-800-GO-U-HAUL" with a zero, and "1-800-GO-U-
HALL" with a zero); Express Mortgage Brokers Inc. v. Simpson Mortgage Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1371, 1372 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (comparing "369-CASH" with "1-800-
760-CASH"); Bell v. Kidan, 836 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving local area
telephone number "CALL-LAW" with toll-free telephone number "I-800-LAW-
CALL"); Multi-Local Media Corp. v. 800 Yellow Book Inc., 813 F. Supp. 199, 202
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving service mark "YELLOW BOOK" with telephone number "I-
800-YELLOW-B[OOK]"); Kelley Blue Book v. Car Smarts, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 282
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A competitor may cause confusion by obtaining an identical vanity
telephone number in a different area code or toll-free code. One well-
known example was the use of "1-800-MATFRES" to compete against a
business that heavily marketed the number "1-212-MATTRES." 6 Con-
fusion can also result if a competitor uses a vanity number that is only
slightly different from an existing number. In such cases, confusion is
likely to occur if the consumer tends to misspell the vanity term on the
telephone keypad. For example, prior to adopting the toll-free collect
calling number "1-800-CALL-ATF," AT&T marketed the mnemonic
"1-800-OPERATOR."7 AT&T abandoned the number, however, after
MCI obtained the misspelled mnemonic "1-800-OPERATER" and suc-
ceeded in diverting half a million dollars of business per month in calls
intended for AT&T.8 Finally, a competitor can also cause confusion by
obtaining a vanity number that contains the identical word or phrase as
an existing number, and substituting the numbers "0" or "1" for the let-
ter "o" (which corresponds to the keypad number 6), or the letter "i"
(which corresponds with the keypad number 4). For instance, a travel
service used the number "1-800-HOLIDAY" (with a zero) to intercept
misdialed calls to the Holiday Inns hotel chain reservation number "1-
800-HOLIDAY" (with the letter "o").
9
While vanity telephone numbers are eligible for protection under
trademark and unfair competition law,1" judicial application of the law
has been inconsistent. As a result, the level of protection afforded to
vanity numbers has often been inappropriate." In addition, the Federal
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (comparing service mark "KELLEY BLUE BOOK" with telephone
numbers "1-900-BLU-BOOK" and "1-800-BLUE-BOOK"); Murrin, 726 F. Supp. at 1199
(involving local area telephone number "LAWYERS" versus toll-free telephone number
"1-800-LAWYERS"); American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622
F. Supp. 673, 674 (N.D. I11. 1985) (involving service mark "AMERICAN" versus tele-
phone number "1-800-AMERICAN"); Chicago Worlds' Fair-1992 Corp. v. 1992 Chicago
Worlds' Fair Comm'n, No. 83-C3424, slip op. at 1 (N.D. I11. Aug. 16, 1983) (involving a
dispute between "444-1992" versus "434-1992" where year "1992" was significant);
Southwestern Bell, 920 S.W.2d at 547 (involving "772-ROOF" versus "773-ROOF"); Cy-
tanovich Reading Ctr. v. Reading Game, 162 Cal. App. 3d 107, 109 (Ct. App. 1984) (com-
paring "321-READ" with "494-READ").
6. See Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678.
7. Daniel Briere, Vanity Telephone Numbers May Spell Trouble, NETWORK
WORLD, Aug. 15, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, ComPub File.
8. See id.
9. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620.
10. See id. at 625; Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 856; Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at
678.
11. See infra Part II.A.1-2 (indicating that some courts have given vanity telephone
numbers containing generic terms too much protection when generic terms should receive
no protection, while others courts have not given enough protection to trademark pro-
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Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) 2 aggravated
the situation by recently issuing an order 3 that provided de facto trade-
mark protection to potentially thousands of toll-free vanity telephone
numbers that do not warrant such protection. 4 This de facto protection
occurred when the FCC authorized the use of a new "888" toll-free code
to supplement the exhausted "800" toll-free code. 5 The FCC, respond-
ing to complaints from holders of vanity numbers in the "800" code,
agreed to prevent parties from obtaining equivalent vanity telephone
numbers in the newly released "888" code. 6 The Commission indicated
tectable terms contained in vanity telephone numbers).
12. The FCC is the federal agency that regulates telephone service nationwide pur-
suant to § 201(b) of the Communications Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994). The Com-
mission has the authority to prescribe all rules and regulations in connection with com-
mon carriers' charges, practices, classifications, and regulations. See id. Section 151 of
the Act provides that the Commission make available to "the people of the United States
a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communications service."
Id. § 151.
13. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496. The Report and Order addressed the issues
that the FCC determined were essential to the opening of the new "888" code in March
1996. See id. at 2509. After soliciting comments on whether to permit vanity number
holders a right of first refusal for their corresponding numbers in the new toll-free code,
the Commission temporarily ordered that certain requested vanity numbers be placed in
an unavailable status until the Commission could resolve whether those numbers should
be given permanent special rights or protection. See id. In addition, on the issue of how
the reservations process should proceed, the FCC ordered that all numbers, other than
the disputed vanity numbers, should be available on a first-come, first-served basis, with a
conservation plan in place to prevent an overload of the database during the reservation
process. See id. Further, in response to comments on tariff rules and procedures to gov-
ern the new toll-free services offerings, the Commission determined that the new "888"
code would be treated identically to the "800" code. See id.
14. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 12:1, at 12-3 to 12-4 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that generic terms receive
no protection under trademark law). Trademark protection is inappropriate in situations
where a vanity telephone number contains generic terms. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d
at 857 (stating that protection given to generic terms would provide an unfair competitive
advantage to holders of those terms); MCCARTHY, supra, § 12:1, at 12-4 to 12-5 (discuss-
ing the differences between generic terms and trademarks).
15. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496. The first new toll-free exchange was the "888"
exchange, released in March 1996. See id.
16. See id. at 2504. Holders of vanity numbers in the "800" code argued that they
should be given a preemptive right to obtain the identical numbers in the "888" code. See
Reply Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC
Dkt. No. 95-155, at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Reply Comments of 1-800-
FLOWERS] (arguing that a preemptive right of first refusal should be granted to "800"
vanity telephone number holders); Comments of Dial-A-Mattress, supra note 3, at 1 (ar-
guing that companies with "800" vanity telephone numbers should receive a right of first
refusal). The FCC initially resisted these requests citing concerns that a preemptive set-
aside would greatly accelerate the depletion of numbers in the new toll-free code. See
NPRM, supra note 1, at 13703. Additionally, the FCC did not have significant time to
consider the question because an order had to be released on an expedited schedule due
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that this was a temporary measure, 7 but in the interim an anti-
competitive situation has resulted in which numerous toll-free vanity
telephone numbers have obtained de facto trademark protection, even
though they may deserve little or no protection.18
This Comment analyzes the appropriate level of trademark protection
that should be afforded to vanity telephone numbers and questions the
FCC's protection of vanity telephone numbers in toll-free exchanges.
Part I examines the history of trademark protection afforded by courts to
vanity telephone numbers. Part II focuses on cases in which the courts
have strayed from basic trademark principles resulting in an inconsistent
application of the law and inappropriate levels of protection being given
to vanity telephone number holders. Part II also analyzes the impact of
the FCC's endeavor to regulate the issuance of vanity telephone num-
bers. Part III of this Comment argues that existing trademark law, cor-
rectly applied, is sufficient to provide the appropriate level of protection
to vanity telephone numbers. This Comment provides the appropriate
trademark analysis for vanity telephone numbers, and critiques the
FCC's actions to date. The FCC's involvement, although described as
temporary, has inappropriately afforded de facto trademark protection
to existing vanity telephone numbers in the "800" code. This Comment
concludes that courts, through a proper application of trademark law,
can provide a more appropriate level of protection by preserving the in-
tended balance in trademark law between safeguarding recognized
marks and encouraging competition.
"to the rapid depletion and imminent exhaust of 800 numbers." Id. at 13701. Thus,
rather than resolve the issue immediately, the FCC adopted an interim solution of permit-
ting holders of "800" vanity numbers to file requests with the FCC seeking to have the
equivalent "888" telephone numbers blocked off in the new exchange. See Order, supra
note 1, at 2496.
17. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496, 2509; cf. In re Toll Free Service Access Codes,
Second Report and Order, 62 Fed. Reg. 20,126 (1997) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 52).
On July 2, 1997, the FCC issued a public notice announcing that it was readdressing the
issues. In order to update what had become a stale record, the Commission requested
that interested parties file additional comments by July 21, 1997 and reply comments by
July 28, 1997. See In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,476 (1997) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed July 2, 1997).
18. See Comments of The Weather Channel, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule
Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 9 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of The
Weather Channel] ("The law does not protect The Weather Channel ... because the
word "WEATHER" cannot be trademarked."); see also Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS,
supra note 2, at 14 (admitting that not all terms can be protected under trademark law);
Comments of The Competitive Telecommunications Assoc., to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 13 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of CTA]
("The Commission should not act to hinder the development of [trademark law]" as ap-
plied to vanity telephone numbers).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK LAW AS APPLIED TO VANITY
TELEPHONE NUMBERS
Trademark law protects the public from confusion or deception, and
protects a valid trademark holder from attempts by competitors to capi-
talize on the trademark holder's goodwill.19 It is settled law that vanity
telephone numbers are protectable under trademark law.20 Courts, how-
ever, have provided inconsistent levels of protection to vanity telephone
numbers.2 For example, some courts have declined to find an actionable
case of trademark infringement when a defendant uses, but does not ad-
vertise, a confusingly similar vanity telephone number to siphon business
from the holder of a trademark protected telephone number.22 Other
courts have protected common descriptive or generic terms in telephone
numbers, which should never be protected."
19. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating
that a trademark's function is "to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his"). The Supreme
Court has explained that a producer should be the one to reap the financial benefits asso-
ciated with its product or service, not an imitating competitor. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacob-
son Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 2:2
(discussing how the policies of trademark protection include "consumer protection, prop-
erty rights, economic efficiency," and justice). The Supreme Court has stated that "[bly
applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the trademark's owner, the
infringer deprives the owner of the goodwill which he spent energy, time, and money to
obtain." Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982). In an earlier
opinion, the Supreme Court stated that where a party has labeled goods in a way that
purchasers recognize the goods marked as the producer's, others were prohibited from
applying the same mark to goods of a like kind, because it would deprive the first pro-
ducer of his potential profits. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412
(1916).
20. See supra note 5 (citing cases involving vanity telephone numbers protected as
trademarks).
21. Compare Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir.
1989) (protecting the generic term "MATTRESS" in a telephone number used to sell
mattresses), with Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 860 (3d Cir. 1992) (de-
nying protection for the generic term "INJURY" used in a telephone number to sell the
legal services of a personal injury attorney).
22. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
23. See Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678; see also Anthony L. Fletcher & David J.
Kera, The Forty-Third Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 80
TRADEMARK REP. 591, 675-76 (1990) (questioning the protection given by courts to ge-
neric terms contained in telephone numbers); Terry Ann Smith, Comment, Telephone
Numbers That Spell Generic Terms: A Protectable Trademark or an Invitation to Mo-
nopolize a Market?, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 1079, 1097-1102 (1994) (describing the split of
authority that exists on protecting generic terms in telephone numbers and advocating
that generic terms should not be protected); Elizabeth A. Horky, Note, 1-800-I-AM-
VAIN: Should Telephone Mnemonics Be Protected As Trademarks?, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
213, 236-39 (1995) (describing the debate over whether generic terms contained in tele-
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A. Basic Principles of Trademark Law: The Lanham Act
The federal statute governing trademark law is the Lanham Trade-
mark Act of 1946.24 The Lanham Act provides for the federal registra-
tion of trademarks, which gives a trademark owner important legal rights
and benefits.2 The Lanham Act also provides remedies to registered
trademark owners for trademark infringement
26 and unfair competition. 2
Vanity telephone numbers, 2 shapes,29 sounds," scents,31 and colors3 2 have
all been registered and protected as trademarks.
phone numbers should be protected).
24. See Lanham Act §§ 1-45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof-(1) used by a
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to iden-
tify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown.
Id. § 1127.
This Comment does not address the effect of the Lanham Act on state common and
statutory law governing trademarks. See la JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 8.02 (1996) (explaining that state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b).
26. See id. § 1114.
27. See id. § 1125(a). The Lanham Act also protects famous marks from dilution by
providing injunctive relief against another's commercial use of the mark. See 15 U.S.C.A
§ 1125(c) (West Supp. 1997). This Comment, however, does not address the issue of dilu-
tion.
28. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 7:13, at 7-16 ("An alphanumeric telephone
number may be used in such a way as to become a trademark."); see also supra note 5
(citing cases involving vanity telephone number disputes).
29. See, e.g., Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 1980) (protect-
ing a ticket dispenser configuration); Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc.,
428 F. Supp. 689, 694-95 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (protecting the Rolls-Royce automobile grill);
Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 913 (D.N.J. 1976) (protecting a
cone shaped parking meter configuration); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 7:38
(discussing that shapes can be protectable under trademark law).
30. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (noting
the valid registration of NBC's use of three chimes for radio and television station identi-
fication); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 7:104, at 7-237 to 7-238 (discussing that
sound characteristics are capable of trademark protection).
31. See In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238, 1240 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (protecting a
floral fragrance similar to plumeria blossoms applied to sewing thread); 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 14, § 7:105, at 7-238 (discussing the holding in In re Clarke).
32. See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 174 (protecting green-gold color on pads used on dry
cleaning presses); In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (protecting the color pink on insulating material); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 14, § 7:40, at 7-68 (noting the Supreme Court's holding in Qualitex).
33. See supra notes 28-32. The Lanham Act also provides comparable protection for
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A mark, to be registerable or protected by a court, must meet certain
standards based on its strength and level of distinctiveness.- There are
four categories of distinctiveness, ranked strongest to weakest, that de-
termine the level of trademark protection." A mark may be arbitrary or
service marks, which designate a service rather than a product. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1994). Section 1127 defines a service mark the same as a trademark to the extent that a
service mark is used "to identify and distinguish the services of one person." Id. In this
Comment, the term "trademark" will be used to refer to both trademarks and service
marks.
34. See McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979); 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 19:10 (discussing the criteria that a mark must meet to be
eligible for registration). Distinctiveness is determined by ranking a mark in one of four
categories: generic, descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful. See McGregor-
Doniger, 599 F.2d at 1131; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9
(2d Cir. 1976); see also infra notes 36-39 (describing each of the four categories).
35. See Freedom Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1182 (11th Cir. 1985);
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977); Aber-
crombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:2; cf. 20th Century
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating that catego-
rizing a mark is a "slippery business" because there are no clear cut guidelines to follow);
1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 2.01, at 2-5 (noting that courts generally agree on




fanciful,36 suggestive,37 descriptive,38 or generic.39 Arbitrary, fanciful, and
36. See Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980) (defining
arbitrary or fanciful marks as being unrelated to the common name or description of a
good or service). For example, the mark Kodak as applied to film is fanciful and the mark
Apple as applied to computers is arbitrary. See id.; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 11:4-
11:6. These marks "are subject to the broadest scope of protection," and "can be pro-
tected without a proof of secondary meaning." DORIS E. LONG, UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND THE LANHAM AcT § 2.3.2.4., at 50-51 (1993).
37. See Vision Ctr. v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 115 (5th Cir. 1979) (defining a sug-
gestive mark as implying rather than describing a characteristic of a good or service with
which the mark is associated). A suggestive mark indirectly describes the product or
service it identifies, thus requiring a consumer to engage in deductive reasoning to associ-
ate the mark with the indirect description. See id.; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:67
(noting that some courts apply the "imagination test," which includes measuring the level
of imagination a consumer must use to obtain an exact description of the product, to de-
termine whether a mark is suggestive or descriptive). "GREYHOUND" is an example of
a suggestive mark. Consumers consider a Greyhound to be a fast racing dog, thus sug-
gesting that the bus service is also fast. See id. at § 11:67, 11-111. Other examples are
"SPARKLE" for window cleaner and "PENGUIN" for a food freezer. See id.
38. See Vision Ctr., 596 F.2d at 115 (defining a descriptive term as identifying a
"characteristic or quality" of a good or service). Descriptive marks are usually adjectives
or adverbs that describe "the intended purpose, function or use of," size, or desirable
characteristics of a product. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:16; see also 1 GILSON
& SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 2.02-2.03. A merely descriptive mark will not be given
trademark protection unless "secondary meaning" is established. See 1 MCCARTHY, su-
pra note 14, § 11:25. The term "secondary meaning" denotes that a mark has developed a
unique association with a specific product or service, such that "in the minds of the public,
the primary significance of a product feature ... is to identify the source of the product
rather than the product itself." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159,
163 (1995) (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll (1982)).
Factors used to determine whether a mark has developed secondary meaning include: (1)
duration and manner of usage; (2) effort and expenditure of money toward developing a
reputation; (3) survey evidence; (4) sales volume; and (5) extent of advertising expense.
See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 15:30, at 15-47 & n.5. The theory behind secondary
meaning is that if consumers do not view the mark as an indication of origin, a competi-
tor's use of a similar mark will not lead to a likelihood of consumer confusion about the
origin and no recognizable harm will occur. See id. § 15:11.
Descriptive and suggestive marks are sometimes difficult to distinguish, and as a result,
courts use certain factors to determine the appropriate category of a mark. See 1 id
§ 11:71. One factor is the amount of imagination consumers must use to associate the de-
scription of the good or service with the mark. See id. 11:67. The more imagination re-
quired, the more likely the mark will be deemed suggestive. See id. Another factor is
whether a competitor will need to use the term to adequately describe its own products or
services to consumers. See id. § 11:68. If the mark is needed by competitors, then the
mark is more likely to be deemed descriptive. See id.
39. See Liquid Controls Corp. v. Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 936 (7th Cir.
1986) (describing a generic name to be the common descriptive name of a good). A mark
is generic if "the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public" is
the product itself, instead of the producer. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S.
111, 118 (1938); see A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986) (es-
pousing the primary significance test); see also 1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 24, §
2.02, at 2-26 to 2-27 (describing the test to determine whether a mark is generic). For a
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suggestive marks may be registered immediately on the Principal Regis-
ter." Descriptive marks can be registered on the Principal Register only
upon a showing of secondary meaning.41 Generic terms cannot be regis-
tered either on the Principal Register or the Supplemental Register, and
42courts should not afford them trademark protection.
There is, however, a small exception to the rule that generic terms do
not receive trademark protection. Under the common law concept of
unfair competition, a limited remedy of "distinguishing" is available to a
first user of a generic term against a second user of the term in connec-
mark to become generic, the primary significance of the mark must be its designation of
the product or class, rather than its designation as the source. See A.J. Canfield, 808 F.2d
at 299; Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936) (finding
that a majority of the public used the term "cellophane" as the name of a product, rather
than as a particular good produced by Dupont). To determine whether a mark is generic,
courts consider factors such as its "dictionary definition[], expert testimony, use of the
term in other marks.... and the availability of commonly used alternatives." LONG, su-
pra note 36, § 2.3.2.1., at 46 (citing cases for survey evidence). Generic marks are usually
nouns and may be dictionary terms. See 1 GILSON & SAMUELS supra note 24, § 2.02, at 2-
15; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 12:4 (determining whether a term is generic depends
on how the public perceives the word).
40. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 11:4, at 11-9, 11:62, at 11-105.
41. See id. at § 11:53.
42. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1992); PATENT
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, EXAMINATION GUIDE No. 1-94 [hereinafter EXAMINATION
GUIDE], available in 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, Appendix A9(9), at A9-140 to A9-143;
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 12:1. But see Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page,
880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989) (protecting the term "MATIRES" in a telephone num-
ber that was used to sell mattresses). "[N]o matter how much money and effort the user
of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise ... [the user]
cannot deprive [competitors] of the product of the right to call an article by its name,"
and, thus, millions of dollars spent on advertising the mark will still not make it protect-
able. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see
WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d 1320, 1327 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding the word "OPRY" ge-
neric despite use for more than 50 years); Technical Publ'g Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc.,
222 US.P.Q. (BNA) 815, 816 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding the mark generic despite its use for
more than one and a half years); Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763,
766, 769 (D. Conn. 1983) (finding the term "TOLL HOUSE" generic for cookies despite
$140 million in advertising and $1 billion in sales of product during a 10-year period);
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. New York Air Lines, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1270, 1273-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (finding the term "AIR SHUT'LE" generic despite the expenditure of more than
$5 million in advertising).
If a term has dual meaning but the majority of the public believes it to be the common
name of a good or service, the mark will be considered generic. See 1 GILSON &
SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 2.02[1], at 2-29; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 12:6. If other
alternative terms are available to sufficiently describe a commodity, however, then a
mark may not be classified as generic, but descriptive. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at
859.
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tion with similar goods or services. 43 This remedy was established by the
Supreme Court in 1938 in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.,44 in which
the Court examined the term "shredded wheat" for cereal.45 Although
the term "shredded wheat" was deemed generic, the Court required the
junior user46 of the generic term to reasonably distinguish its product
from that of the senior user 47 to ensure no confusion would result as to
the source of the goods.48
Since generic terms cannot be protected as trademarks, only marks
that are arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or descriptive with secondary
meaning can be protected against infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 if
the mark is federally registered, or under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) if the mark
is not federally registered.49 The test for infringement under both § 1114
and § 1125(a) is whether a challenged mark creates a likelihood of con-
43. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120; Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Met-
ric's, Inc., 635 F.2d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (indicating that a generic mark might be enti-
tled to protection if it is "so associated with its goods that the use of the same or similar
marks by another company constitutes a representation that its goods come from the
same source" (quoting Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144,147
(2d Cir. 1956)); 1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 2.02[1], at 2-29 n.24 (citing Mur-
phy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys. Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989), for the proposi-
tion that an infringer cannot use a generic term to pass off his products for those of an-
other user of a generic mark).
44. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). National Biscuit Company sued Kellogg Company for its
use of the term "shredded wheat," claiming the public associated the term with National.
See id. at 115-16. The Court acknowledged that National's long-term use of the term
"shredded wheat" resulted in a public association of the term with National, but the Court
found that lengthy association was not enough to warrant exclusive use of a generic term.
See id. at 117-18. Instead, the Court held that the standard to overcome a term being
designated as generic was whether "the primary significance of the term in the minds of
the consuming public is not the product but the producer." Id. at 118. National did not
meet that burden of proof. See id. at 118-19. The Court held that a second user could use
the generic term, but would be required to use every reasonable means to prevent confu-
sion. See id.
45. See id. at 118.
46. A junior user adopts a mark after another has already utilized the same or simi-
lar mark. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:1, at 23-7 to 23-8 (implying the term
"junior user"). The Federal Circuit has noted that the court will resolve doubts against a
junior user when balancing the interests in an established mark against the junior user's
mark. See Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distribs. Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 676 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
47. A senior user is the first user of a mark. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:1.
48. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119. The Court found that Kellogg had sufficiently dis-
tinguished its product from National's because the product was two-thirds the size of Na-
tional's product, and was labeled in such a way as to prevent confusion. See id. at 121.
The Court, however, explained that the second user would not have to go so far as to
prove to the purchaser that it was the maker, but only would have to take "reasonable
means to prevent confusion." Id.
49. See Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,1125(a) (1994).
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fusion with a protected mark.5" Courts consider a number of factors, in-
cluding the similarity between the marks and products and the strength
of a mark, to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists between
marks."'
50. See id. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Section 1114(1)(a) provides that any person shall be
liable for using:
in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or ad-
vertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
Id. § 1114(1)(a). Colorable imitation has been defined as "any mark which so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive." Id. § 1127.
Section 1125(a)(1) provides that:
[any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof.., which.., is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable
in a civil action.
Id. § 1125(a)(1). Section 1125(a) applies only when the complainant's mark meets basic
trademark requirements. See Yarmuth-Dion, Inc. v. D'ion Furs, Inc., 835 F.2d 990, 992
(2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a plaintiff has the burden of proof to show an unregistered
mark is valid as a trademark in order to receive protection under the Lanham Act).
The Ninth Circuit has stated that regardless of whether a case is based on "infringe-
ment, unfair competition or false designation of origin, the test is identical-is there a
'likelihood of confusion?'" New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201
(9th Cir. 1979); see also Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d
Cir. 1978) (stating that a likelihood of confusion exists if "an appreciable number of ordi-
narily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the
source of the goods in question").
51. See In re E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973);
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Each circuit has
its own variation of the "likelihood of confusion" factors, but in each circuit the factors
are similar. 1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 5.01[3][i], at 5-16 & n.19, (describing
the factors used by the First, Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, and stating
that there is little substantive distinction between the factors used by the various circuits);
LONG, supra note 36, § 2.5 (listing the "likelihood of confusion" factors for every United
States Circuit Court of Appeals). The factors generally include: (1) the degree of similar-
ity between the marks in appearance and suggestion; (2) the similarity of the products for
which the mark is used; (3) the area and manner of concurrent use; (4) the degree of care
likely to be exercised by consumers; (5) the strength of the complainant's mark; (6) actual
confusion; and (7) an intent on the part of the alleged infringer to palm off his products as
those of another. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 560 F.2d
1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977); Polaroid Corp., 287 F.2d at 495.
The most extensive list of "likelihood of confusion" factors was set forth by the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re E. L DuPont DeNemours & Co.:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appear-
ance, sound, connotation and commercial impression.
(2) The similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as de-
scribed in an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark
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B. Vanity Telephone Numbers: Judicial Conflict as to Proper
Application of Trademark Law
The widespread use of telephone numbers as trademarks is a relatively
recent phenomenon. As a result, only three United States circuit courts
of appeal, a handful of federal district courts, and a few state courts have
considered the appropriate level of protection that should be afforded to
vanity telephone numbers. 3 The lack of cases on this issue is aggravated
is in use.
(3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade chan-
nels.
(4) The conditions under which and buyer to whom sales are made, i.e. "im-
pulse" vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.
(5) The fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use).
(6) The number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods.
(7) The nature and extent of any actual confusion.
(8) The length of time during and conditions under which there has been concur-
rent use without evidence of actual confusion.
(9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house mark, "family"
mark, product mark).
(10) The market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior mark:
(a) a mere "consent" to register or use.
(b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e. limitations on con-
tinued use of the marks by each party.
(c) assignment of mark, application, registration and good will of the related
business.
(d) laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of
lack of confusion.
(11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its
mark on its goods.
(12) The extent of potential confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial.
(13) Any other established fact probative of the effect of use.
In re E. L DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. Other market-place circumstances can also be con-
sidered in a decision regarding likelihood of confusion. See 1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra
note 24, § 5.01[3][iii] (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21
(1995)); LONG, supra note 36, § 2.4, at 55 nn.111-12 (citing cases in which courts have
considered additional factors such as the similarity of the advertising, media used, and the
percentage of customers who would be confused by a similar mark). No one factor is
conclusive because the likelihood of confusion analysis is often imprecise and subjective
in nature. See E. L DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361; LONG, supra note 36, § 2.4, at 55.
52. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 856 (3d Cir. 1992). The first
case to protect a telephone number as a trademark was Chicago Worlds' Fair-1992 Corp.
v. 1992 Chicago Worlds' Fair Comm'n. No. 83-C3424, slip op. at 5 (N.D. I11. Aug. 16,
1983) (finding infringement in the defendant's use of the number, "434-1992" against
"444-1992").
53. See supra note 5 (listing cases that have decided disputes between vanity tele-
phone numbers); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 7:13 (discussing those cases
dealing with trademark protection given to vanity telephone numbers).
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by the fact that trademark cases are fact-intensive 4 Thus, a decision in-
volving unique facts in one case often provides little precedental value.5
In applying trademark law to vanity telephone numbers, courts have
struggled with the following issues: (1) the level of protection afforded to
a vanity number that contains a generic or merely descriptive word,56 (2)
whether the unadvertised use of a confusingly similar vanity telephone
number by a junior user constitutes an infringing "use" under the Lan-
ham Act 7 and (3) whether a junior user of a confusingly similar vanity
telephone number should be held liable for having "caused" confusion,
when some level of confusion is inherent in the operation of a tele-
phone. 8
1. Judicial Dispute: Level of Protection Courts Have Given to Generic
Terms in Vanity Telephone Numbers
Federal courts have disagreed on the extent of protection vanity tele-
phone numbers containing generic terms should be afforded. 9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that such
numbers can be protected under trademark law. 6° In Dial-A-Mattress
Franchise Corp. v. Page,61 the plaintiff, the senior user of the term
"MATTRES" in a local telephone number, challenged the use by a
competitor of the same term in the "800" toll-free exchange." A magis-
trate judge recommended that the defendant-junior user be permitted to
use "1-800-MATTRES" if it provided an appropriate disclaimer.63 The
54. See 1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 5.01[3][i], at 5-16.
55. See id.
56. See infra Part I1.A.1. For example, the California Appeals Court in Cytanovich
Reading Cr. v. Reading Game declined to recognize the telephone number "321-READ"
as a valid trademark because the term "read" was too commonly used, and thus, was ge-
neric. See 162 Cal. App. 3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 1984).
57. See infra Part II.A.2 (arguing that the statutory definition of "use" includes the
mere operation of a telephone number).
58. See infra Part II.A.3 (arguing that liability should be found based on the public's
confusion as to the source of goods or services, not on any public confusion that may exist
in dialing a telephone number).
59. See supra note 5 (discussing cases where courts accorded varying levels of protec-
tion to vanity telephone numbers containing generic terms).
60. See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989).
61. 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
62. See id. at 676-77.
63. See id. at 677. The magistrate recommended that the junior user of "1-800-
MATTRES" adopt the following distinguishing greeting: "Easy Bed. We are not con-
nected with Dial-A-Mattress which advertises on radio and television." Id. The recom-
mendation also provided that the defendant should provide "a disclaimer of any connec-
tion to Dial-A-Mattress in his advertisements." Id.
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district court judge, however, disregarded the recommendation and pro-
hibited the defendant from receiving any telephone calls to the "800"
number that originated in the local area codes where the plaintiff had its
number.' The Second Circuit affirmed the decision even after acknowl-
edging that the plaintiff could not claim trademark rights in the word
"mattress" or "mattres."'6 While the court noted that a junior user could
66
use a generic term if it distinguished itself from the first user, it never-
theless enjoined the defendant from using the number.67
Contrary to the Second Circuit's decision in Dial-A-Mattress, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Dranoff-
Perlstein Associates v. Sklar6' held that a vanity number containing a ge-
neric term was not eligible for trademark protection.69 In Dranoff-
Perlstein, the court examined whether a telephone number that spelled
"INJURY-9" infringed upon the telephone number "INJURY-1."
70
Both numbers were used by personal injury attorneys.7' The Third Cir-
cuit found that a mark that corresponded to a telephone number could
64. See id. The defendant also was required to pay charges to the telephone com-
pany to block those calls from the 1-800 number. See id.
65. See id. (citing Miller Brewing Co. v. Heileman Brewing Co, 561 F.2d 75, 81 (7th
Cir. 1977)).
66. See id. at 678 (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119
(1938)). The court stated that a plaintiff would not lose the right to protection against a
defendant's unfair use of a confusingly similar number simply because it contained a ge-
neric mark. See id.
67. See id. at 678; cf. Express Mortgage Brokers Inc. v. Simpson Mortgage Inc., 31
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1371, 1373-74 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (granting an injunction under similar
circumstances). In Express Mortgage, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held that the term "CASH" in a mortgage company's local telephone
number was descriptive rather than generic. See id. at 1373. The court then provided
protection to the term when it found secondary meaning from the plaintiff's long-term use
of the number and due to the fact that a large amount of money had been used to adver-
tise the number. See id. at 1374. To support its decision that "CASH" was descriptive
rather than generic, the court noted that while "CASH" was an ingredient of the plain-
tiff's mortgage brokerage services, competitors had many alternative terms available to
describe their mortgage brokerage businesses. See id. The Court provided examples such
as 1-800-MORTGAGE, 1-800-LOAN-YES, and 1-800-MONEY-i. See id. Thus, the
court prohibited the defendant, a competitor in the mortgage brokerage business, from
using "1-800-760-CASH." See id.
68. 967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992).
69. See id. at 860.
70. See id. at 853-54.
71. See id. The attorney who operated "INJURY-l" was the senior user. See id.
The district court dismissed the action, holding that the mark was not entitled to protec-
tion either because it was generic or descriptive and lacking secondary meaning. See id.
at 854. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court to the extent that "INJURY" was
generic, but reversed and remanded the case to more fully consider the question of sec-
ondary meaning of the composite mark "INJURY-I." See id. at 862 n.26, 863.
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be protected, but only if the mark acted as an indicator of source, spon-
72sorship, or approval, and met the other requirements of trademark law.
Applying traditional trademark principles, the court found that the use
of "INJURY" in a telephone number was generic," and that protection
of the term in the telephone number would provide the plaintiff with an
unfair competitive advantage.74 Thus, a split exists between the circuits
with respect to the level of protection that should be afforded to generic
vanity telephone numbers."
72. See id. at 856. The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) permits
registration of a term with numerals in the form of a telephone number, so long as the
term conforms with traditional trademark law. See EXAMINATION GUIDE, reprinted in 5
MCCARTHY, supra note 14, Appendix A9(9), at A9-140 to A9-143. In January 1994, the
PTO announced a new policy that it would decline to register any vanity telephone num-
ber that contained a generic or merely descriptive terms. See id. at A9-143. The PTO
followed the Third Circuit's approach in Dranoff-Perlstein that a mark in the form of a
telephone number is insufficient, by itself, to render a mark distinctive. See id.
73. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 860. The court determined that "INJURY" in
the mark "INJURY-i" was generic because the term was commonly descriptive of "per-
sonal injury law." Id. The court noted that competitors must be allowed to use terms that
signify or describe the nature of the product they are selling; to hold otherwise would put
those businesses at a "serious competitive disadvantage." Id. at 857, 860. Additionally,
the court noted that few alternative terms exist for competitors to use because of the lim-
ited number of spaces-seven characters-available in a telephone number. See id. at
859-60.
74. See id. at 859-60. Even though the term did not directly relate to the description
of the service, "personal injury law," the court still found the term "injury" generic be-
cause the term related to a distinctive characteristic of the genus of the service. See id. at
860. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the word had acquired
secondary meaning, and if so, whether the junior use was likely to cause confusion. See
id. at 862.
Generic telephone numbers have been refused protection by other courts. See Murrin
v. Midco Communications, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D. Minn. 1989). In Murrin, the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota examined the plaintiff's service
mark "Dial L.A.W.Y.E.R.S.," used in connection with the local telephone number "1-
612-LAWYERS," against the defendant's use of the telephone number "1-800-
LAWYERS." See id. at 1200-01. The court allowed the defendant to continue operating
the number, but prohibited the defendant from advertising the number in a manner that
would infringe upon the plaintiff's service mark outside the geographic area where the
defendant had common law rights. See id. at 1201. A Missouri State Court of Appeals
also held that generic terms as contained in telephone numbers should not be protectable
under trademark law. See Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Wilkins, 920 S.W.2d
544, 546 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). In Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, the court was con-
fronted with a dispute involving the telephone numbers of two roofing companies, "772-
ROOF" and "773-ROOF." See id. The court found the term "ROOF" generic and said
that to provide protection to the term would deprive others of the right to use the com-
mon name of their services or products. See id. at 549-50 (citing Clipper Cruise Line, Inc.
v. Star Clippers, Inc., 952 F.2d 1046, 1047-48 (8th Cir. 1992)).
75. See Fletcher & Kera, supra note 23, at 675-76 (describing the Second Circuit's
decision in Dial-A-Mattress); Horky, supra note 23, at 236-39 (describing the split be-
tween the Second and Third Circuits); Smith, supra note 23, at 1097-1102 (citing same
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2. The "Use" Under the Lanham Act: What Type of "Use" is Required
A recent issue that has arisen in infringement cases involving vanity
telephone numbers is whether a defendant has engaged in actionable
"use" of a protected mark.76 Some courts have required that an action-
able "use" of an infringing vanity telephone number must include adver-
tisement or active promotion of the number in an alphanumeric form by
the defendant." This requirement was adopted by the United States




The dispute in Holiday Inns involved the number "1-800-HOLIDAY"
used by the Holiday Inns hotel chain.79 A travel service began using the
number "1-800-HOLIDAY" (with a zero instead of the letter "o") to se-
cure hotel reservations for callers that misdialed Holiday Inns's vanity
telephone number.'s The defendants admitted that the sole reason the
telephone number was obtained "was to intercept calls from misdialed
customers who were attempting to reach Holiday Inns.""1 The district
court held that such "nefarious use" constituted both trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition." The district court found that the
defendants were profiting from the advertising efforts and expenditures
of Holiday Inns, 3 and issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the de-
split). The International Trademark Association and several vanity telephone numbers
holders referred to this judicial conflict as one reason why the FCC should regulate the
distribution of new toll-free vanity numbers. See Letter from Mary Ann Alford, Presi-
dent, International Trademark Association, to William Caton, Secretary, Federal Com-
munications Commission (Aug. 28, 1996) (on file with the FCC) [hereinafter Letter from
Mary Ann Alford] (regarding In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)).
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994). Under § 1114, the defendant must use
"any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark," and
under § 1125(a), "any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof."
Id. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
77. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 624-26 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
78. 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997). The case involved
three defendants: a consulting company that obtained 800 numbers for other companies, a
hotel reservation agency, and a travel agency. See id. at 620.
79. See id. at 620.
80. See id. Some of the reservations the defendants made were for Holiday Inns.
See id.
81. Id. at 621. The district court found that the defendants had no independent repu-
tation because a customer would not even be aware of the travel agency's existence until
after the customer misdialed Holiday Inns's number. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reser-
vation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1255 (E.D. Tenn. 1993), rev'd, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
82. See Holiday Inns, 838 F. Supp. at 1255.
83. See id. The defendants also purchased complementary numbers of other compa-
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fendant from using the similar number."4
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that the
defendants had not "used" a confusingly similar mark. 5 The court noted
that the telephone number, "1-800-405-4329," was "neither phonetically
nor visually similar to Holiday Inns's trademark, 1-800-HOLIDAY." s
The court suggested that the Lanham Act's "use" requirement would be
satisfied only if a defendant actively promoted or advertised a decep-
tively similar vanity number. 7 The court found that without the prereq-
uisite "use" by defendants of a representation of Holiday Inns's pro-
tected mark, further analysis was unnecessary."'
The Sixth Circuit relied in part on a district court decision, American
Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp.,9 where that court
stated in dicta that the mere use of a alphanumeric telephone number
that was similar to a protectable trademark did not constitute an action-
able use under the Lanham Act. 9° American Airlines brought suit
against a travel agency that used the number "1-800-AMERICA[N]"'
nies that were frequently misdialed, including Hampton Inn, Howard Johnson, Stouffers
Hotels, Loews Hotels, Sheraton, Compri Hotels, Savoy Hotels, Peabody Hotels, and Days
Inns. See id. at 1251 n.5.
84. See id. at 1255. The district court found that "present technology allows defen-
dants to use plaintiff's mark in such a way that they can anticipate actual confusion with
absolute accuracy and can profit accordingly." Id.
85. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620.
86. Id. at 623.
87. See id. at 624 (distinguishing Dial-A-Mattress based on the defendant's adver-
tisement of "1-800-MATIRES" in alphanumeric form). Since the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion, two district courts within the Sixth Circuit have followed the reasoning in Holiday
Inns and concluded that the mere use of a confusingly similar vanity telephone number,
without promotion or advertisement of the alphanumeric form, does not constitute an ac-
tionable "use" under the Lanham Act. See Miss Dig Sys., Inc. v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc.,
944 F. Supp. 600, 602-03 (E.D. Mich. 1996); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Kresch, 943 F. Supp. 802,
806-07 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
The U-Haul court stated that in light of the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Holiday
Inns, a plaintiff could not claim trademark rights against misdialed or complementary
numbers. See 943 F. Supp. at 807. U-Haul had provided no evidence that the defendant
had advertised any of the allegedly infringing telephone numbers in an alphanumeric
form. See id. at 809 & n.6. The district court in Miss Dig initially granted a preliminary
injunction against the defendants' use of the telephone number "I-800-MISS-DIG" find-
ing that the telephone number constituted a "use" of the Plaintiff's trademark "1-810-
MISS-DIG." See 944 F. Supp. at 601. The court relied on the district court's decision in
Holiday Inns. See id. After the Sixth Circuit decision, however, the court held that since
the defendant did not advertise the number in alphanumeric form, there was no violation
of the Lanham Act. See id. at 605.
88. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 626.
89. 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. I11. 1985).
90. See id. at 682.
91. See id. at 676. Even though the number was "1-800-AMERICA," the number
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and advertised the number under the "Airline Companies" section in the
yellow pages.9 The court found that the defendant's wrongful conduct
resulted from the misleading advertisements in the yellow pages, rather
than from the mere use of the telephone number. 9' The defendant was
enjoined from using the telephone number, but only as long as it was
listed in a yellow page directory under "Airline Companies" or in an
equivalent section.94
At the present time, the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit that has de-
cided the question whether a challenged vanity number must be adver-
tised or promoted in order for there to be an actionable "use" under the
Lanham Act. The Second Circuit, in Dial-A-Mattress," did not appear to
require a showing that the defendant had advertised the challenged
number in order to find infringement." While in that case the defendant
had advertised the infringing number, the court concluded "that defen-
dant's use of the telephone number 1-800-628-8737 was confusingly
similar to plaintiffs telephone number 628-8737... especially in view of
defendant's identification of its number as 1-800-MATTRESS" in adver-
tisements.97 Thus, the question of what constitutes an actionable "use"
of a confusingly similar vanity telephone number remains unresolved in
the federal circuit courts of appeal.9'
could be dialed as "I-800-AMERICAN" because dialing the eighth letter would not af-
fect the proper connection of the phone call. See id
92. See id. at 675.
93. See id at 682, 686.
94. See id. Specifically, the defendant was enjoined from: (1) using in its trade name,
or trade designation, the words "A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N," "A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N,"
"AMERICAN," or any confusingly similar name in connection with air transportation
services; and (2) taking further action to have its trade name listed under the 'Airline
Companies' section in any yellow page directory. See id. The defendant, however, could
use the telephone number, but not while "any yellow-pages telephone directories in which
[the defendant was] listed with that telephone number under the "Airline Companies" (or
substantially identical) section continue[d] to be in active circulation anywhere in the
United States and Canada." Id. It is important to note, however, that before the court
entered a temporary restraining order, it sought to persuade the defendant to use its tele-
phone number to contract with "companies that [sold] goods or services other than airline
transportation--companies [for which] the use of the telephone cipher AMERICA or
AMERICAN would have a value from which [the defendant] might legitimately derive
financial benefit." Id. at 682. The court offered this solution so that American would not
be "subjected to the continued risks of (a) losing business from persons who believe they
are calling it when they call [the defendant's] number and (b) suffering other damages to
its mark and its goodwill from [the defendant's] conduct over which it has no quality con-
trol." Id. at 682-83.
95. 880 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. See id. at 678.
97. Id.
98. Compare Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 624-25 (6th Cir.
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3. The Relevance of "Existing Confiusion"
Further, the courts have struggled over the issue of whether the use of
a confusingly similar telephone number results in actionable confusion
under the Lanham Act."9 In Holiday Inns, the Sixth Circuit suggested in
dicta that even if the defendants had "used" a similar vanity telephone
number, actionable confusion did not exist because "the confusion al-
ready existed among the misdialing public."''0°
Prior to the Sixth Circuit's opinion, no court appears to have ques-
tioned whether liability for use of a confusingly similar vanity number
could be precluded by "existing confusion." The Third Circuit, in Dra-
noff-Perlstein, while not addressing the issue of the likelihood of confu-
sion between two vanity telephone numbers, stated that the proper stan-
dard to be applied to an allegedly infringing number was the traditional
likelihood of confusion factors.'O' The court explained that the standard
was whether "consumers viewing the mark [or dialing the defendant's
vanity telephone number] would probably assume that the product or
service it represents is associated with the source of a different product
or service identified by a similar mark," such as the plaintiff's vanity
telephone number."2 Thus, there may be a conflict between the circuits
1996) (finding that "1-800-HOLIDAY," with a zero, was not an infringement of "1-800-
HOLIDAY," with the letter "o", because the defendants had not advertised their num-
ber), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997), with Dial-A -Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678 (finding that
operation of the number in its numeric form was a sufficient use to infringe upon the local
number).
99. See Lanham Act, §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994) (prohibiting
uses likely to cause confusion).
100. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625.
101. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 862 (3d Cir. 1992). Other
courts have applied the likelihood of confusion standard to vanity telephone numbers.
See Bell v. Kidan, 836 F. Supp. 125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). In Bell, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York performed a detailed application of the
likelihood of confusion factors to a defendant's telephone number. See id. In comparing
the defendant's use of the telephone number "1-800-LAW-CALL" with the plaintiff's lo-
cal telephone number "CALL-LAW," the district court found no actionable confusion
because, among other reasons: (1) the plaintiff's mark was not a strong mark because it
fell into either the "suggestive" or "descriptive" category; (2) the similarity between the
numbers was small because one number was local and the other toll-free; (3) the defen-
dant had not used bad faith in choosing the number; and (4) customers would be sophisti-
cated enough to know the difference between a toll-free call and a local toll call, and
would know that the different spellings of the advertised words would render different
number combinations when dialed. See id.
102. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 862 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor
Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 292 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Scott Liquid
Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978))).
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as to how much weight "existing confusion" should be given in a likeli-
hood of confusion analysis. °3
C. FCC Involvement with Vanity Telephone Numbers
The FCC's involvement with vanity telephone number disputes stems
from its decision to release new toll-free codes. °4 In early 1995, the FCC
determined that "800" numbers were being depleted and a new ex-
change code would be necessary. °5 In Comments submitted to the FCC,
numerous holders of vanity telephone numbers in the 800 code urged the
Commission to give them a right of first refusal to obtain matching num-
bers in the new toll-free code.0 6 Some commentators argued that the
FCC should provide them with protection because existing trademark
law does not adequately protect a holder's interests.
0 7
103. See infra Part II.A (discussing vanity telephone number cases in detail); infra
Part III.A (analyzing vanity telephone number cases in light of traditional trademark
principles).
104. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496; NPRM, supra note 1, at 13692.
105. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496; NPRM, supra note 1, at 13692. The FCC pro-
vided seven new codes for future relief of toll-free telephone number prefix shortages:
888, 877, 866, 855, 844, 833, and 822. See NPRM, supra note 1, at 13694 n.23. Several fac-
tors led to the exhaustion of the "800" toll-free numbers. First, some telephone compa-
nies began marketing toll-free numbers to residential customers. See Chris Reidy, It'll be
a Tough Call to Make, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 1995, at 33; Letter from Braden L.
Lutz, 1.800.BAL.LOON Flowers and Gifts, to Secretary, Federal Communications Com-
mission (Oct. 31, 1995) (on file with the FCC) [hereinafter Letter from Braden Lutz] (re-
garding In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10
F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)). Additionally, paging companies found increased customer
satisfaction by assigning a separate 800 number for each pager leased. Laurence Zuck-
erman, Is Someone Hoarding Those '800' Numbers?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at D4.
Moreover, many large companies use separate toll-free numbers for different functions
within the company. For example, one number may be used for customer service, while
another may be used by the employees handling administrative matters. See Comments
of Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No.
95-155, at 8 n.12 (Nov. 1, 1995) (noting that Avis uses approximately 250 toll-free num-
bers, of which 50 (or 20%) are considered vanity numbers); Comments of Crestar Bank,
to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 2 (Nov. 1, 1995) (noting
that Crestar uses about 100 toll-free numbers). Finally, marketing companies producing
large numbers of television commercials, 30-minute infomercials, and various types of
print advertisements, use different toll-free numbers for each commercial or advertise-
ment to determine consumer response to different advertising strategies. See Comments
of NIMA International, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at
2 (Nov. 1, 1995).
106. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496 (acknowledging requests made by vanity number
holders).
107. See Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 3-4; Comments of Dial-A-
Mattress, supra note 3, at 1.
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In a January 1996 order,' the FCC adopted a compromise by making
temporarily unavailable, upon a holder's request, any identical vanity
telephone number in the newly released "888" exchange. 9 By making
these numbers unavailable, the FCC indicated that it was deferring its
final decision on whether to give current "800" vanity telephone num-
bers a right of first refusal over matching numbers in the "888" code."
The impact of the FCC's decision is analyzed below.
II. ANALYSIS: How COURTS HAVE STRAYED FROM A PROPER
APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK LAW AND THE IMPACT OF THE
FCC's DECISION TO REGULATE VANITY TELEPHONE NUMBERS
The principles of trademark law are carefully designed to strike a bal-
ance between two competing goals. First, the law protects consumers
from confusion as to the source of goods and services, and ensures that
established marks are not misused by competitors."' Second, trademark
law is tempered to prevent a senior user of a descriptive or generic mark
from misusing its seniority to impair a new competitor's ability to ade-
quately describe its goods or services."2
These same principles should be applied to adequately protect the in-
terests of vanity telephone number holders, while not providing them
with an unfair competitive advantage over others."3 Unfortunately,
courts that have considered vanity telephone number disputes have in-
consistently applied trademark law."4 Consequently, holders of vanity
telephone numbers have received an insufficient level of trademark pro-
tection in some circuits, and too much protection in others."5
108. See supra note 13 (discussing the January 1996 FCC order). The Order was is-
sued after Comments were received in response to the FCC's Notice of Proposed Rule-
making, dated October 5, 1995. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496.
109. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496, 2504.
110. See id. at 2496.
111. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (stating that the purpose of the trademark
statute was to protect the public from confusion and protect the trademark owner's in-
vestment); H.R. REP. No. 79-219, at 2 (1945) (stating the same purpose); 1 MCCARTHY,
supra note 14, § 1:2, at 1-6.
112. See supra Part L.A (discussing basic trademark principles that should be applied
to generic terms).
113. See infra Part III.A (suggesting a proper application of trademark law courts
should apply to vanity telephone numbers).
114. See infra Part II.A (analyzing three specific mistakes courts have made when ap-
plying trademark law to vanity telephone numbers).
115. See infra Part II.A (analyzing how different courts have come to completely dif-
ferent holdings pertaining to generic terms in telephone numbers, and how other courts
have misinterpreted the plain meaning of the Lanham Act to find no harm where action-
able harm in fact occurred).
[Vol. 46:11991220
19971 Vanity Telephone Numbers 1221
This inconsistency led many toll-free vanity number holders to lobby
the FCC to set aside matching vanity telephone numbers in the new toll-
free codes."6 Even though courts have been inconsistent, it is inappro-
priate for the FCC to engage in regulation of vanity telephone num-
bers.' 17 Instead, courts should correct past judicial mistakes, and take a
more uniform approach to resolving trademark disputes involving vanity
telephone numbers."' While analysis of such disputes requires consid-
eration of unique characteristics involving telephone numbers, a tradi-
tional trademark analysis can effectively accommodate these issues."'
A. Three Primary Mistakes Courts Have Made When Applying
Trademark Law to Vanity Telephone Numbers
Current principles of trademark law can provide an appropriate level
of protection for holders of vanity telephone numbers.2 ° Unfortunately,
courts have provided insufficient trademark protection to such numbers,
primarily due to three misapplications of trademark law to vanity tele-
phone numbers. 2' First, in determining whether a vanity telephone
116. See, e.g., Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 3-4 (stating that the
FCC should provide its numbers with protection because traditional trademark principles
indicated that they should receive no protection); Comments of The Weather Channel,
supra note 18, at 9 (acknowledging that "[t]he law does not protect The Weather Chan-
nel ... because the word "WEATHER" cannot be trademarked," and asking for the
Commission's assistance and protection); Joint Reply Comments of Dial 800, supra note
4, at 3. For example, considering the court decisions that addressed protection of vanity
telephone numbers, businesses were concerned that if competitors gained control of iden-
tical or similar vanity telephone numbers in the new toll-free codes, their numbers would
be inadequately protected. Cf. NPRM, supra note 1, at 13707 ("Toll free numbers are
essential to many businesses both in terms of marketing and advertising products. Toll
free numbers may also have an intrinsic value to many businesses.").
117. See infra Part II.B (indicating that the FCC has given de facto trademark protec-
tion tomany vanity telephone numbers that should not be protected as trademarks).
118. See infra Part III.A (discussing the proper trademark standard that should be ap-
plied by courts to vanity telephone numbers).
119. See infra Part III.A (taking into account the unique factors of telephone numbers
in a likelihood of confusion analysis); infra notes 172-75 (discussing non-traditional fac-
tors that courts have considered).
120. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855-862 (3d Cir. 1992) (ap-
plying trademark law to a vanity telephone number).
121. See Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 14 (arguing that trademark
law will not afford adequate protection to vanity telephone numbers); Letter from Mary
Ann Alford, supra note 75 (stating that "trademark law alone is sometimes inadequate to
prevent consumer confusion between different entities holding nearly identical vanity
numbers" because "recently [trademark law has] fallen short in protecting against unad-
vertised uses of numbers that correspond to confusingly similar terms or near misspellings
of the vanity number"); infra Part II.A.1-4 (discussing the inconsistencies that exist in
trademark law as to vanity telephone numbers).
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number is protectable as a trademark, some courts have provided pro-
tection to generic terms used in vanity telephone numbers. 2 Such pro-
tection is inappropriate, however, because generic terms should never be
protected as trademarks.'
Second, some courts have incorrectly construed the term "use" in §
1114 and § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act to require that a junior user in a
vanity telephone number dispute not only operate a telephone number,
but also advertise or actively promote the number in its alphanumeric
form.' 4 This two-prong requirement is in conflict with the express lan-
guage of the Lanham Act and fails to adequately protect trademark
holders in cases where a defendant uses an unadvertised and confusingly
similar number to siphon away business from the trademark holder. '
Third, at least one court has suggested that liability should not arise in
vanity telephone number disputes where confusion already exists due to
the public's habit of inadvertently misdialing a vanity telephone num-
ber. 26 Such a result is inappropriate, however, because confusion with
respect to the operation of a telephone is completely unrelated to the ac-
tionable confusion as to the source of a product protected under the
Lanham Act."' Each of these issues will be discussed in turn.
1. Generic Vanity Telephone Numbers Should Not Receive
Trademark Protection
It is a basic principle of trademark law that a trademark should iden-
122. See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989).
But see Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857-60 (declining to protect a generic mark); supra
note 42 and accompanying text (discussing the PTO's position on registering telephone
numbers that contain generic terms).
123. See supra notes 39 and 42 and accompanying text (discussing generic marks).
124. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997); Miss Dig Sys., Inc. v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc., 944 F.
Supp. 600, 605 (E.D. Mich. 1996); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Kresch, 943 F. Supp. 802, 809 & n.6
(E.D. Mich. 1996).
125. See Letter from Mary Ann Alford, supra note 75, at 2 (discussing the results in
Holiday Inns and U-Haul).
126. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625.
127. See Lanham Act, §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994). Liability
should be based not on whether confusion exists, but on whether the allegedly infringing
mark violates the Lanham Act's definition of actionable confusion. Section 1125 provides
liability based on the particular acts that are likely to cause confusion "as to the affilia-
tion, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval," rather than based on general confusion of the public. Id. §
1125. Section 1114 provides liability for particular acts that include "reproduction, coun-
terfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark" which are "likely to cause con-
fusion, or cause mistake, or to deceive." Id. § 1114.
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tify a product without giving the merchant an unfair competitive advan-
tage.' 2 An unfair competitive advantage may result when a mark con-
sists of merely descriptive or generic terms that competitors may need to
adequately describe their goods or services. 29 Moreover, an unfair com-
petitive advantage may result when a mark consists of one of a limited
number of terms that the public uses to identify a commodity.' 3
Applying these principles, it can be concluded that too much protec-
tion was provided to a generic vanity telephone number holder in the
Second Circuit's decision in Dial-A-Mattress. In that case, a senior user
of a generic local vanity telephone number, "MATrRES," was granted
trademark protection against a junior user of the same core telephone
number in the "800" code.3 ' The court stated that the plaintiff could not
claim a trademark right in the word "mattress" or "mattres" because
both words were generic."' Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the
case could not be decided solely upon generic principles, and allowed the
plaintiff protection against the defendant's use of the confusingly similar
number.'33 To support its decision, the court cited previous cases in-
volving confusingly similar telephone numbers.) 4 The cases cited, how-
ever, are distinguishable because they involved protectable trademark
terms, not generic terms.'35
The only remedy the Second Circuit should have provided was estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.:6 a
128. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 859-60 (3d Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that it would not protect a generic term within a telephone number); supra note 42
(discussing the principles of "genericness" and the reasons why generic terms should not
be protected under trademark law).
129. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §
12:1.
130. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 860 (comparing "INJURY" and personal in-
jury attorneys).
131. See Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, 880 F.2d 675,678 (2d Cir. 1989).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. (citing Chicago Worlds' Fair-1992 Corp. v. 1992 Chicago Worlds' Fair
Comm'n, No. 83-C3424 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16,1983)); SODIMA v. Int'l Yogurt Co., Inc., 662
F. Supp. 839, 852-54 (D. Ore. 1987); American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-
N Corp., 622 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. I11. 1985)).
135. For example, American Airlines had a federally registered trademark covering
the word "American" in "1-800-AMERICA(N)." See American Airlines, 622 F. Supp. at
683. In SODIMA, the plaintiff's mark was also a federally registered trademark. See
SODIMA, 662 F. Supp. at 841. In Chicago World's Fair-1992 Corp., the court found
"1992" as contained in a telephone number to be protectable. See Chicago World's Fair-
1992 Corp., No. 83-C3424, slip op. at 5.
136. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
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junior user is required to distinguish its goods or services from those of a
senior user.137 Thus, when the court found "MATTRESS" to be a ge-
neric term, the court should have allowed the defendant to continue us-
ing the telephone number as long as the defendant distinguished its mat-
tress business from the plaintiffs mattress business."' When the court
prohibited the defendant from using the generic vanity telephone num-
ber in the same area as the plaintiff, the plaintiff was provided an unfair
advantage over others who need the term "mattress" to describe their
businesses. 139
The Third Circuit's analysis in Dranoff-Perlstein provides the proper
treatment of a generic vanity telephone number."4 The Third Circuit
adhered to basic trademark principles regarding generic terms, and rec-
ognized that if protection were granted to a vanity number containing a
generic term, the holder of that number would have an unfair competi-
tive advantage over competitors. 4 '
To determine whether a term in a vanity telephone number is generic,
the Dranoff-Perlstein court emphasized a basic trademark principle: if no
available alternatives exist to effectively communicate the same func-
tional information, a term will be considered generic.142 Applying this
137. See id. at 119. The Dial-A-Mattress court referred to the Kellogg decision, noting
that a subsequent user,
though entitled to use a generic term already used by its competitor, may be
enjoined from passing itself or its product off as the first user or that user's
product and may be required to take steps to distinguish itself or its product
from the first user or that user's product.
Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678 (citing Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111,
(1938)).
138. See Dial-A -Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678 (acknowledging that Kellogg requires a sec-
ond user of a generic term to distinguish its products or services from those of the first
user). The magistrate judge recommended the following telephone greeting to distinguish
the defendant's number: "Easy Bed. We are not connected with Dial-A-Mattress which
advertises on radio and television." Id. at 677.
139. See id. at 677-78; see also supra notes 39 and 42 (discussing the reasons why ge-
neric terms should not be protected); cf. Murrin v. Midco Communications, Inc., 726 F.
Supp. 1195, 1201 (D. Minn. 1989) (permitting a defendant's use of a generic vanity num-
ber, but prohibiting advertisements that would infringe the plaintiff's service mark).
140. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855-63 (3d Cir. 1992) (ap-
plying traditional trademark principles to a generic term in a vanity telephone number).
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota also reached an equitable
result in Murrin. There, the court applied basic trademark principles and did not prohibit
the second user from using the term "LAWYERS" in a telephone number used in con-
nection with attorney services. See Murrin, 726 F. Supp. at 1201. Although the second
user could use the telephone number, he could not advertise the telephone number in
such a way that would infringe the plaintiff's service mark. See id.
141. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857.
142. See id. at 859-60.
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principle, the court found that the term "INJURY" was generic for two
reasons.14'3 First, "INJURY" was a term needed by other personal injury
attorneys to effectively describe their services.' 44 Second, the number of
available alternatives existing for vanity telephone numbers was "se-
verely limited" because telephone numbers are limited to seven charac-
ters.145  Significantly, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) now follows the Third Circuit's approach,'146 declining to register
vanity telephone numbers that contain generic or merely descriptive
terms.
141
Despite the split among circuits, the more appropriate treatment is
evident. Basic trademark principles should be followed when determin-
ing whether the terms contained in telephone numbers are protectable.48
Vanity telephone numbers containing generic terms should be protected
only to the extent indicated by the Supreme Court in Kellogg-the jun-
ior user should use every reasonable means to prevent confusion, but
should not be enjoined from using the generic term.
49
2. An Operable Telephone Number Should Meet the Lanham Act
Requirement of "Use"
The Sixth Circuit's recent decision in Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reser-
vation, Inc.5' adversely affected holders of trademark protectable vanity
telephone numbers by adding a heightened standard of proof to a vanity
number infringement analysis. 5' The case involved the defendant's use
of the telephone number "1-800-405-4329" or "1-800-HOLIDAY" (with
a zero) to intercept calls from customers that had misdialed "1-800-
143. See id.
144. See id. at 860.
145. See id. at 855 n.6, 859. Telephone numbers are limited to seven or eleven charac-
ters or digits, depending on whether the area code or exchanges such as 800, 888, and 900
are utilized to spell or indicate the origin, source, approval, or affiliation of a good or
service. See id.
146. See EXAMINATION GUIDE, 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, Appendix A9(9), at
A9-143.
147. See id.; 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 7:13, at 7-16 to 7-18 & n.5.
148. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857-60.
149. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1938); Dranoff-
Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857-860 (applying trademark principles to generic terms in tele-
phone numbers).
150. 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
151. See id. at 625-26; Miss Dig Sys., Inc. v. Power Plus Eng'g, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 600,
604-05 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (following the Sixth's Circuit's reasoning); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v.
Kresch, 943 F. Supp. 802, 806 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same); see also Letter from Mary Ann
Alford, supra note 75, at 2.
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HOLIDAY" (with the letter "o").'52 The court declined to hold that the
use of the number, "1-800-405-4329," qualified as a potentially infringing
use of a device or combination of symbols.'53 Instead, the court held that
the defendants had not used Holiday Inns's mark or a similar copy of the
mark because the defendants had not actively promoted or advertised
the telephone number in its alphanumeric form, "1-800-HOLIDAY.'
'15 4
This advertising requirement is inappropriate in light of the express
language of the Lanham Act.' Sections 1114 and 1125(a) of the Act ex-
pressly prohibit both the use or the advertisement of a confusingly simi-
lar mark.'56 For example, § 1114 prohibits confusingly similar junior uses
"of a registered mark in connection with the sale ... or advertising of
any goods or services. "' Additionally, § 1127 defines "use in com-
merce" as applied to services as "used or displayed in the sale or adver-
tising of services."' 58
Furthermore, under the Act, an infringing mark does not have to be
an exact copy of the plaintiff's mark, but instead can be a "colorable imi-
tation" under § 1114,' or a symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin under § 1125(a)." ° Thus, the
mere use or operation of a telephone number, whether in alphanumeric
form or not, should be sufficient to qualify as a "use" under the Lanham
Act because it can easily be construed as a "symbol," "device," or "col-
152. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620.
153. See id. at 624-25.
154. See id. (distinguishing Dial-A-Mattress based on defendant's advertisement of its
vanity number). The defendants in Holiday Inns only engaged in minimal advertisement
and never promoted their number. See id. The court relied in part on American Airlines,
Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., where the district court found the wrongful con-
duct was the misleading use of the advertisements "rather than [the defendant's] mere use
of its telephone number." See 622 F. Supp. 673, 682, 678 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1985); see also
Murrin v. Midco Communications, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1195, 1200-01 (D. Minn. 1989)
(stating that advertisement of a number would infringe, but not the mere use of a confus-
ingly similar telephone number).
155. See Lanham Act, §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994); see also 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 46.01, at 82 (5th ed.
1992) ("If the language is plain, unambiguous and uncontrolled by other parts of the
act.., the court cannot give it a different meaning.").
156. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a).
157. Id. § 1114 (emphasis added); see also id. § 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting a confusingly
similar junior use which "(A) is likely to cause confusion .... or (B) in commercial adver-
tising or promotion, misrepresents" the senior user's mark (emphasis added)).
158. Id. § 1127 (emphasis added).
159. See id. § 1114. A colorable imitation "includes any mark which so resembles a
registered mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive." Id. § 1127.
160. See id. § 1125(a).
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orable imitation" of a protected mark or a false designation of origin. 6'
The Second Circuit's approach appears to be in accord with this inter-
pretation of the statute. In Dial-A-Mattress, the court specifically en-
joined the defendant junior user of a vanity telephone number based on
two separate uses by the defendant: "[the] use of a confusingly similar
telephone number and [the use of] a confusingly similar means of identi-
fying that number."'62 To determine whether the numbers at issue were
confusingly similar, the court compared the numbers in numeric form. 63
Only after concluding that the numbers in numeric form were confus-
ingly similar did the court add that the defendant's use was infringing,
"especially in view of defendant's identification of its number as 1-800-
MAT[RESS."'' 4 The advertising of the challenged number by the de-
fendant was not a prerequisite to liability, but was used only as a factor
in determining the extent of liability.'65
The Second Circuit's analysis in Dial-A-Mattress may illustrate why
the Sixth Circuit inappropriately adopted an advertising requirement in
Holiday Inns. The Dial-A-Mattress court was willing to compare the dis-
puted telephone numbers in their most confusingly similar forms."" In
Holiday Inns, however, the court declined to compare the competing
numbers in their most confusingly similar forms, but instead compared
"1-800-405-4329" with "1-800-HOLIDAY" and came to the conclusion
that the challenged number was "neither phonetically nor visually similar
to Holiday Inns's trademark, 1-800-HOLIDAY."' 67 The Sixth Circuit's
unwillingness to scrutinize the defendants's number in its more confusing
alphanumeric form was inappropriate because trademark law directs a
court, when comparing marks in an infringement analysis, to attempt to
161. See American Airlines, Inc. v. A 1-800-A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N Corp., 622 F. Supp.
673, 682 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (finding that the advertisement of a confusingly similar vanity
telephone number created liability, while the use of a confusingly similar vanity telephone
number would not warrant a cause of action); cf. Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v.
Page, 880 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that a defendant's use of a telephone num-
ber was likely to cause confusion).
162. Dial-A-Mattress, 880 F.2d at 678 (emphasis added).
163. See id (finding the defendant's telephone number 1-800-628-8737 confusingly
similar to plaintiff's local telephone number 628-8737).
164. Id.
165. See id. (concluding that use of the plaintiff's telephone number by the defendant
after the plaintiff's promotion of the number was increased indicia of "confusingly simi-
lar" activity).
166. See id. (explaining the similarity of the telephone numbers underlying the word
"MATTRESS").
167. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
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recreate the conditions under which consumers make their choices.168 A
reviewing court should "place itself in the shoes" of a prospective cus-
tomer, and should take "into account the mythical ordinary prospective
purchaser's capacity to discriminate as well as his propensity for care-
lessness."'69
Applying these rules to vanity numbers, courts should anticipate the
conditions under which consumers conduct business with vanity tele-
phone number holders: consumers are prone to use wrong area codes,
mistake zeros and ones for the letters "o" and "i," respectively, which
precipitates incorrect numbers being depressed. Courts can take these
shortcomings into account by comparing disputed numbers in their most
confusingly similar forms-their similarity with respect to the keypads
that must be depressed to dial each number correctly. For example, in
Holiday Inns, only one minor difference existed between the keypads
depressed for "1-800-405-4329" and "1-800-HOLIDAY": the use of a
zero for the letter "o," a distinction that can easily be overlooked by an
inattentive consumer.7 ' Furthermore, applicable trademark law does
not require that a purchaser remember the exact details of a trademark,
but only have a "general impression" of it.1
7
1
An analogy can be made to the foreign equivalents doctrine, which re-
quires courts to "translate" a defendant's mark into its more confusingly
similar English form in order to fully assess the likelihood of confusion.'
168. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 504 (8th Cir.
1987) ("[A] court should try to determine not what it would do, but what a reasonable
purchaser in market conditions would do."); G. D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 265
F.2d 385, 388 (7th Cir. 1959) (stating that prospective purchaser conditions must be con-
sidered); Quaker Oats Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 134 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1943) (de-
picting trademark analysis from the viewpoint of the consuming public); E. I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 510 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that
a court should not dictate the customers' state of mind); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §
23:58 (discussing the importance of marketplace comparisons in a confusion analysis).
169. E. I. DuPont, 393 F. Supp. at 510. Side-by-side comparisons may not adequately
reflect the conditions in which consumers would see or use the marks in the marketplace.
See supra note 168 (discussing cases that direct courts to view the mark from the con-
sumer's standpoint).
170. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620.
171. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 161 (9th
Cir. 1963); Distillerie Filli Ramazzotti v. Banfi Prods. Corp., 276 N.Y.S.2d 413, 419-21
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
172. See, e.g., In re American Safety Razor Co., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1459, 1460
(T.T.A.B. 1987) (concluding that "BUENOS DIAS" for soap would likely cause confu-
sion with "GOOD MORNING" for shaving cream); In re Hub Distrib., Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 284, 285 & n.1 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (finding "EL SOL" for wearing apparel would
likely cause confusion with "SUN" for foot wear); Rosenblum v. George Willsher & Co.,
161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 492, 492 (T.T.A.B. 1969) (finding "TORO ROJO" equivalent to
1228
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Additionally, when courts are asked to consider marks that may sound,
but not look, confusingly similar, the law directs that courts should not
use the "correct" pronunciation of a word, but should consider the pro-
nunciation used by the public.'73 Moreover, when a challenged trade-
mark is neither visually nor phonetically similar to a plaintiff's mark, a
court is still required to consider the meaning invoked by the respective
marks. 4 The use of a mark which causes confusion because it conveys
the same idea should be enjoined on the same basis as if it were similar
in sight and sound.'75
These rules lend guidance to the appropriate analysis that should be
applied to a challenged vanity telephone number. Courts should con-
duct comparisons based on the public's habit of misdialing telephone
"RED BULL"); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:34; 3 id. §§ 23:36, 23:40.
173. See Lebow Bros., Inc. v. Lebole Euroconf S.P.A., 503 F. Supp. 209, 211-12 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (stating that the likelihood of confusion is based on how the "public employs a
usual or likely pronunciation rather than the 'correct' pronunciation"); Jules Berman &
Assocs., Inc. v. Consolidated Distilled Prods., Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 67, 70 & n.4
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (stating that the controlling factor in determining likelihood of confusion
based upon pronunciation is how the ordinary purchaser understands the pronunciation of
the word).
174. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating
similarity can be found by closeness in meaning); Plough, Inc. v. Kreis Lab., 314 F.2d 635,
639 (9th Cir. 1963) (discussing the different meanings of the words "COCA" and
"COPA"); 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:90. Additionally, courts routinely examine
the phonetic characteristics of trademarks that are visually distinguishable. See Esso, Inc.
v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1938) (finding "SO" visually distinguishable,
with "ESSO," but identical in sound, and, therefore, finding "SO" to be confusingly simi-
lar to "ESSO"). In examining the phonetic similarities of trademarks, courts are required
to determine how the average purchaser might pronounce the word rather than how the
defendant believes the word should be pronounced. See J. B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte
Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 192-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding error in assuming that
Americans would pronounce "LE CONTE" in the French manner with the accent on the
final syllable so as to make it distinguishable from "CONTI"). Courts also consider
whether a mark that constitutes a picture is likely to cause confusion with a trademark
protected word. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding that Mobil Oil's design mark of a flying horse with wings was infringed
by the word mark "Pegasus").
175. See Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 73-74 (10th Cir. 1958)
("The use of a designation which causes confusion because it conveys the same idea, or
stimulates the same mental reaction, or has the same meaning is enjoined on the same
basis as where the similarity goes to the eye or the ear."); Hancock v. American Steel &
Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 741-42 (C.C.P.A. 1953)(finding that "TORNADO" fences in-
fringed the trademark of "CYCLONE" fences).
Thus, if a court is made aware that the public is misdialing a trademark, believing they
will contact the source they mean to contact, the court should inquire if a number similar
to the protected mark means the same to the public. Cf Bell v. Kidan, 836 F. Supp. 125,
126 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (involving "CALL-LAW" v. "LAW-CALL"). If the meaning to the
public is the same as the protected mark, the requisite "use" should be found to exist. See
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 12:1.
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numbers, not whether the numbers are visually or phonetically similar
when placed side by side.'76
Thus, the Sixth's Circuit's holding, that a "use" had not occurred be-
cause the defendant had not advertised or actively promoted its number
in alphanumeric form, demonstrated a misinterpretation of the Lanham
Act, and produced an unfortunate result that is inappropriate in the field
of trademark law.117 Whether a defendant has advertised a vanity num-
ber should be not be considered in a "use" analysis, but considered as
only one factor in determining liability. 17' Finally, in determining
whether an infringement has occurred, courts should translate both
numbers into their alphanumeric forms to accurately reflect mistakes
that may result when consumers dial vanity telephone numbers.
3. Existing Confusion Should Not Alter a Court's Likelihood of
Confusion Analysis
In Holiday Inns, one of the defendants testified that he obtained the
telephone number "1-800-405-4329," which translates to "1-800-
HOLIDAY" (with a zero), for the "sole purpose" of intercepting calls
from Holiday Inns's customers that misdialed the hotel's reservation
number.'79 Through this scheme the "company reaped benefits in direct
proportion to Holiday Inns's efforts at marketing 1-800-HOLIDAY for
securing reservations." ' Despite this irrefutable evidence of both intent
to confuse and actual confusion, 81 the Sixth Circuit stated in dicta that
no actionable confusion existed because "the confusion already existed
among the misdialing public."'' 2 This reliance on "existing confusion"
176. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the standard that should be applied in vanity
telephone number disputes to determine similarity of the marks).
177. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 159 (1997); see also Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114,
1125(a) (1994) (providing use requirements).
178. See supra note 51 (discussing factors in a "likelihood of confusion" analysis).
179. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 621.
180. Id.
181. See id. 620-21. Evidence of intent to confuse is particularly important in trade-
mark law because an intent to confuse customers gives rise to an inference of likely con-
fusion. A defendant who chooses a similar mark "to that of a senior user is saying, in ef-
fect, that he thinks that there is at least a possibility that he can divert some business from
the senior user." Little Caesar Enters., Inc. v. Pizza Caesar, Inc., 834 F.2d 568, 572 (6th
Cir. 1987).
182. Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625. The court did not need to resolve the issue of like-
lihood of confusion because it had already concluded that the defendant had not "used" a
mark similar to the plaintiffs. See id at 626.
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evidences a misunderstanding of the operative definition of confusion
under the Lanham Act.183
Trademark infringement occurs if a use is likely to cause confusion as
to the "affiliation, connection, or association" of the user with a senior
user.1" This confusion as to the source should not be mistaken with con-
fusion as to the operation of a telephone.' For example, in Holiday
Inns, prior to the establishment of the defendants' allegedly infringing
travel business, customers of Holiday Inns that misdialed its "800" num-
ber would have been connected with a business wholly unrelated to ho-
tels, or a telephone company recording indicating the number was not in
service."" Thus, the customer would have quickly realized the error and
no actionable "confusion" as to source, as defined by the Lanham Act,
would have resulted.
1 87
In contrast, once the defendants set up their business, customers of
Holiday Inns that misdialed the hotel's "800" number were connected
with a strikingly similar reservation service.' While it is possible that
the callers might have realized this error, a significant possibility existed
that the callers would have been confused as to the identity of the com-
pany contacted and its affiliation with Holiday Inns."9 Thus, actionable
confusion under the Lanham Act was the direct and intended result of
183. Compare id. at 625, with 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994) (defining a violation under the
Lanham Act will occur when another's mark is likely to cause confusion).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A); see also id. § 1114.
185. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 625 (stating that the public was already confused as
to the dialing of a telephone).
186. In this respect, the Sixth Circuit demonstrated a lack of knowledge about tele-
phone numbers by concurring with an argument, put forth by the defendant, that the de-
fendant's confusingly similar service "may have helped dispel the confusion by answering
calls that would have gone unanswered and informing the customers of their error." Id.
Usually, unassigned telephone numbers do not just keep ringing, but instead are con-
nected with a telephone company recording indicating an error. See D'Vera Cohn, C&P
Sleight of Hand Ensures Smooth Shift to Area Code Calling, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1990, at
B1.
187. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:1, at 23-6 to 23-8 (describing standard for
"likelihood of confusion").
188. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 621.
189. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (E.D.
Tenn. 1993) rev'd, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997). Though
the defendants claimed that a recording or disclaimer was used to inform callers that they
had not reached Holiday Inns, it did not alleviate all the confusion, since the defendants
acknowledged obtaining substantial business. See id Furthermore, other courts have
ruled that disclaimers may not materially reduce customer confusion, and may even tend
to aggravate customer uncertainty. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657, 1665 (E.D. Cal. 1989) (finding that survey results showed that a
disclaimer had very little impact in reducing the level of confusion).
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the defendants' actions. "9 Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit was incorrect
when it suggested that "existing confusion" can preclude liability in a
case involving vanity telephone numbers."1
B. FCC Action Has Inappropriately Provided De Facto Trademark
Protection to Some Vanity Telephone Numbers
In a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking published in October 1995, the
FCC solicited comments on the steps it should take to protect holders of
vanity toll-free "800" numbers following the release of the new "888"
toll-free code.192 The Commission examined this issue after holders of
existing 800 numbers expressed a need for protection, maintaining that
existing trademark law, as applied by the courts, was inadequate to safe-
guard their interests."3  The Commission proposed several options,
foremost of which was granting "800" number holders a right of first re-
fusal over the identical numbers in the new "888" code.194 The Commis-
sion expressed concern, however, that such a preemptive right would
rapidly deplete the available supply of new toll-free numbers.9
190. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 620-21.
191. See id. at 625.
192. See NPRM, supra note 1, at 13701-04. Recently, on July 2, 1997, the FCC an-
nounced it would be updating the record and requested that interested parties file addi-
tional comments. See In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,476 (1997)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 52) (proposed July 2, 1997).
193. See NPRM, supra note 1, at 13703.
194. See id. The Commission also proposed active regulation of toll-free numbers
based on an industrial classification system. See id. at 13703-04. Under this system, the
FCC would have protected holders of 800 numbers by barring other companies in the
same industrial classification from obtaining the corresponding number. See id. at 13704.
195. See id. at 13703. A survey sponsored by a telephone company trade association
indicated that approximately 25% of current "800" number holders may want to replicate
their existing numbers in the new "888" code. See Comments of Sprint Corp., to the No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 18 (Nov. 1, 1995); see also Com-
ments of NYNEX, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 7
(Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of NYNEX] (predicting that as many as 25% of
the available numbers in the "888" Code could be depleted by request for duplication of
existing "800" numbers); Comments of Scherers Communications Group, Inc., to the No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 14 (Nov. 1, 1995) (indicating that
a study of its customers found that 24% would want to replicate vanity "800" numbers in
the "888" code). Additionally, other telephone companies noted that if a right of first re-
fusal was provided for "800" numbers, regional telephone companies would be expected
to provide the same right when new area codes were created. See Comments of Pacific
Bell and Nevada Bell, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at
12 (Nov. 1, 1995) (claiming that customers may expect to keep the same area code num-
bers after a relocation).
Despite substantial evidence of widespread interest in obtaining identical numbers in
the "888" code, it is unclear whether the Commission's concern about rapid depletion of
1232
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The comments submitted in response to the NPRM contrasted
sharply."6 Many companies holding toll-free "800" vanity numbers sub-
mitted comments seeking a preemptive right to the matching number in
the "888" code. 97 Of these companies, many openly acknowledged that
they sought FCC action because the "800" number they were attempting
to protect was generic under trademark law, and thus ineligible for
trademark protection by the PTO and the courts.'98 Holders of such
numbers as "-800-TICKETS,"' 99 "1-800-FOR-WATC(H)," 20 "1-800-
toll-free numbers was valid. Some holders of toll-free numbers pointed out that a right of
first refusal would have absolutely no effect on the rate of depletion of new toll-free num-
bers because all desirable toll-free vanity telephone numbers in the new "888" code
would immediately be reserved, either by the holders of the matching "800" numbers, or
by their competitors, regardless of whether the Commission regulated the reservation
process. See Reply Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 16, at 4; Comments of
TLDP Communications, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-
155, at 2 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of TLDP].
196. Compare, Comments of Dial-A-Mattress, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing for a right
of first refusal), and Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 3-4 (arguing for a
right of first refusal), with Comments of Olsten Corporation, to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 1 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of Olsten]
(seeking "1-888-WORKING" and "1-888-MANAGER," both of which are unavailable in
the "800" code), and Letter from Wally Taggart, Vice President, Maritz Inc., to Reed
Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (Aug. 3, 1995) (on file with the
FCC) [hereinafter Letter from Wally Taggart] (regarding In re Toll Free Service Access
Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)) (asking for as-
sistance to receive certain vanity telephone numbers in the new "888" code).
197. See Comments of Dial-A-Mattress, supra note 3, at 1 (requesting "1-888-
MATTRESS" be reserved); Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 3-4 (re-
questing that "1-888-FLOWERS" be reserved).
198. See, e.g., Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 14 (stating that trade-
mark law will not adequately protect vanity telephone number holders); Comments of
The Weather Channel, supra note 18, at 9 (admitting the word "WEATHER" cannot be
trademarked); Joint Reply Comments of Dial 800, supra note 4, at 3 (claiming that
"trademark law does not offer adequate protection"); Reply Comments of Bass Pro
Shops, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 4-5 (Nov. 22,
1995) ("Current U.S. trademark law and the policies of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ... offer only limited-and uncertain-protection for vanity telephone numbers.").
199. See Letter from 800 Tickets International, Inc., to Federal Communications
Commission (Sept. 8, 1995) (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll Free Service Ac-
cess Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)).
200. See Letter from Timex Corporation, to Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Com-
munications Commission (Sept. 19, 1995) (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll
Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701
(1995)).
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BAL-LOON,"'2 1  "1-800-DENTIST,"'2  "1-800-RENT-A-CAR," 3  "1-
800-4-SOFTWA(RE)," ' 4  "1-800-DISCOUN(T), 20 5  "1-800-RE-
PAIRS, 20 6 "1-800-THERAPI(ST), 20 7 and "1-800-HIV-TEST ' 8 argued
that, based solely on the substantial investments they had made in mar-
keting their generic vanity telephone numbers, principles of equity re-
quired the FCC to provide them with protection.20 9
In contrast, other commentators urged the Commission to refrain from
regulating the assignment of new "888" toll-free numbers."' Some of
201. See Letter from Braden Lutz, supra note 105.
202. See Letter from Applied Anagramics, Inc., to Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission (Aug. 18, 1995) (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll
Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701
(1995)).
203. See Comments of Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule
Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 3 (Nov. 1, 1995).
204. See Letter from Len Dozois, President, Zachary Software, Inc., to Reed Hundt,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re
Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692,
13701 (1995)).
205. See Letter from John C. Hartman, President, 800-Discount Club, Inc., to Kath-
leen Wallman, Chief of Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission
(July 24, 1995) (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll Free Service Access Codes,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)).
206. See Letter from Kerry P. Lauricella, Chairman, Repairs, Inc., to Reed Hundt,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (July 31, 1995) (on file with the FCC)
(regarding In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10
F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)).
207. See Letter from Kevin Grold, President, 1-800-Therapist Network, to Federal
Communications Commission (Oct. 26,1995) (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll
Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701
(1995)).
208. See Letter from Tracey T. Powell, Chairman & CEO, Home Access Health Cor-
poration, to Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (Oct. 5, 1995)
(on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll Free Service Access Codes, Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995)).
209. See supra note 198 (citing comments that argued that trademark law is insuffi-
cient to protect vanity telephone numbers).
210. See, e.g., Reply Comments of The Personal Communications Industry Associa-
tion, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 17 (Nov. 22, 1995)
("Reliance on trademark law provides users with a developed body of law and a clearer
definition of the scope of legal protection than would exist under a Commission first right
of refusal."); Comments of Bell Atlantic, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC
Dkt. No. 95-155, at 7 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of Bell Atlantic] (stating that
intellectual property, unfair competition, and consumer protection laws will safeguard
vanity telephone number holders' rights); Comments of Bellsouth Telecommunications,
Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 17 (Nov. 1, 1995)
(stating federal trademark law and/or state fair business practice or consumer protection
laws can provide remedies to vanity telephone number holders); Comments of CTA, su-
pra note 18, at 13 (arguing that trademark law can protect a vanity telephone number
1234
19971 Vanity Telephone Numbers 1235
these parties acknowledged that they hoped to obtain vanity telephone
numbers in the "888" code that had already been secured by others in
the "800" code."' These parties stressed the difficulties that the FCC
would face in regulating the issuance of vanity telephone numbers.2 2
For example, a single vanity telephone number can have entirely dif-
ferent meanings in different industries."13 The vanity telephone number
"1-800-THE-CARD" (used by American Express for customer service)
could be used by the Hallmark card company in the "888" code to mar-
ket greeting cards, without causing actionable confusion.1 Additionally,
the telephone number that spells "1-800-THE-CARD" also spells THE
holder, and even though protection is limited because vanity telephone number issues are
new and very few cases exist, the "Commission should not act to hinder the development
of law in this area"); Comments of Paging Network, Inc., to the Notice of Proposed Rule
Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 13 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of Paging
Network] (claiming that adequate legal remedies exist to protect vanity telephone num-
ber holders); Comments of Southern New England Telephone Co., to the Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 6 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of
Southern New England Telephone] (arguing that legal protections exist for vanity tele-
phone number holders); Comments of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., to the Notice of
Proposed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 17 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Com-
ments of Southwestern Bell] (arguing that a right of first refusal would be a form of im-
proper discrimination, as many numbers can be used to spell several different words that
businesses could use).
211. See, e.g., Comments of Olsten, supra note 196, at 1 (seeking "1-888-WORKING"
and "1-888-MANAGER," both of which are unavailable in the "800" code); Letter from
Katie Jenkins, The Loewen Group Inc., to Reed Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communica-
tions Commission (Oct. 20, 1995) (on file with the FCC) (regarding In re Toll Free Serv-
ice Access Codes, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 F.C.C.R. 13692, 13701 (1995))
(seeking, among other numbers, "1-888-FUN-ERAL"); Letter from Wally Taggart, supra
note 196 (seeking, among other toll-free numbers, the numbers spelling the words
"INTERNE(T)," "MARKETS," "SELL-NOW," "RESEARCH," "REWARDS,"
"WINNERS," "IMPROVE," "DELIVER," and "AMERICA").
212. See supra note 210 (discussing arguments made against a right of first refusal,
and concluding that trademark law is sufficient to protect vanity telephone number hold-
ers' rights).
213. See, e.g., Reply Comments of John Austin, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 1 (Nov. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Reply Comments of John
Austin] (showing that different words can be spelled with the same string of telephone
keypad numbers); Comments of MFS Communications Co., Inc., to the Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 10 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of
MFS] (stating that identical numbers may be appealing to different types of businesses);
Comments of NYNEX, supra note 195, at 7 (stating that letters on the dial pad associated
with specific numbers may spell more than one word); Comments of Southwestern Bell,
supra note 210, at 17 (stating the mere possibility of confusion should not prevent a com-
pany from obtaining a vanity telephone number in the new toll-free exchange).
214. See supra note 213 (stating that American Express should not have the right to
"1-888-THE-CARD," as the underlying numbers can spell so many other different words
that other companies could use). Admittedly, while some American Express customers
would accidentally call Hallmark when they lose their credit cards, the mistake will be
promptly realized and corrected.
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CASE,215 THE CAPE,216 THE BASE,217 THE BASF,218 TIE CARE,219
THE BARD,220 and THE ACRE.' Thus, numerous business sectors
could claim that they have an equitable right to reserve 843-2273 in the
"888" code, rather than permit American Express to warehouse the
number to avoid competition.222
Unfortunately, faced with a lack of consensus and only a few weeks
before the supply of "800" numbers ran out, the FCC declined to resolve
the question and adopted what it apparently thought was a fair compro-
mise. 3 Although the Commission declined to grant a right of first re-
fusal, it blocked off all matching vanity telephone numbers in the "888"
code that holders of vanity "800" numbers wanted to protect.224 This
meant that while the holder of the "800" number did not gain access to
the matching number in the "888" code, neither did its competitors. 3
The practical effect of the Commission's decision provided de facto
trademark protection to holders of vanity "800" telephone numbers. 6
This decision was particularly inappropriate, because as some commen-
tators pointed out, many of the vanity "800" numbers that companies
215. This telephone number would be an obvious choice for a luggage company or law
firm. See Comments of Telecommunications Resellers Assoc., to the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making in CC Dkt. No. 95-155, at 17 (Nov. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Comments of TRA]
(listing different spellings that could be made from one underlying number).
216. This telephone number would be suitable for a Massachusetts-based travel
agency. See Comments of MFS, supra note 213, at 10.
217. See Comments of TRA, supra note 215, at 17.
218. This telephone number would be appropriate for BASF, the German-based
chemical company. See Reply Comments of John Austin, supra note 213, at 1.
219. See Comments of TRA, supra note 215, at 17.
220. This telephone number would be an obvious choice for the promotor of a renais-
sance faire. See Comments of NYNEX, supra note 195, at 7; Comments of Southwestern
Bell, supra note 210, at 17; Comments of TRA, supra note 215, at 17.
221. This telephone number could be used for a real estate company. See Comments
of TRA, supra note 215, at 17.
222. See supra note 213 (commenting that one number may spell many different
words).
223. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496.
224. See id. at 2496, 2498. The Commission indicated that it would probably revisit
this question within a year. See id. at 2498.
225. See id. at 2496.
226. See supra Part II.B (discussing how the FCC's actions have given de facto protec-
tion to all requesting holders of vanity numbers). Arguably, the Commission's decision to
block off matching "888" vanity numbers was actually more preferable for vanity "800"
number holders than the right of first refusal that they had requested, because the right of
first refusal inevitably would have been accompanied by a substantial annual fee for the
matching "888" number. Cf Order, supra note 1, at 2499 (discussing the reservation pro-
cess). In contrast, the Commission's decision to block off matching "888" vanity numbers
provided de facto trademark protection for free. See id. at 2496.
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sought to protect were generic or merely descriptive under trademark
law'2 7 Thus, they should not have received de facto protection from the
FCC, because such protection disrupted the competitive balance that
trademark law is designed to preserve. 2" By providing de facto protec-
tion to vanity numbers that did not deserve it, the holders of those num-
bers obtained an unfair competitive advantage over their competitors.29
III. COMMENT: THE PROPER STANDARD TO BE APPLIED TO VANITY
TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND THE FCC's ROLE
A. A Proper Application of Trademark Law By Courts to Vanity
Telephone Numbers Negates the Need for FCC Involvement
The proper test to be used in a trademark infringement action is the
traditional "likelihood of confusion" analysis.m Infringement should be
found under § 1114 and § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act only if (1) a plain-
tiffs mark is a valid trademark, and (2) a defendant uses a mark that is
likely to cause confusion.23 In determining whether a plaintiff's vanity
telephone number is a valid trademark, basic trademark principles
should be used. Thus, a vanity telephone number containing a generic
word should never be protected as a trademark3 2 If two competitors are
using the same generic vanity telephone number, the only requirement a
227. See, Comments of Joel DeFabio, to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making in CC
Dkt. No. 95-155, at 1 (Nov. 1, 1995) (arguing that "[t]he vast majority of vanity numbers
consist of generic terms").
228. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 857 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding
no protection should be granted to generic terms because if so, competitors would be
placed at a "serious competitive disadvantage"); infra Part III.A (advocating that existing
trademark principles are sufficient to protect vanity telephone numbers).
229. Cf. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857 (finding that if generic or merely descrip-
tive words were protected, the user would be given an unfair advantage). For example, if
the current user of the number "1-800-FLOWERS" so requested, a florist wishing to use
the number "1-888-FLOWERS" would not at this time be permitted to use the number.
See Order, supra note 1, at 2496. The term "Flowers" however, would be considered ge-
neric to the florist, who needs the term to describe his goods.
230. See Lanham Act §§ 32, 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994); Dranoff-
Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 855, 862-63; Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R. G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d
44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that the crucial issue in a trademark infringement action "is
whether there is any likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent pur-
chasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in
question"); see also supra note 51 (discussing judicial applications of this test).
231. See§§ 1114,1125(a).
232. See Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 857. Additionally, when it is unclear whether a
mark is generic or descriptive, a court should take into account the fact that words in
telephone numbers are limited to only seven spaces. See id at 856-61.
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court should impose is that the junior user distinguish its goods or serv-
ices from those of the senior user."'
To determine whether an allegedly infringing mark is likely to cause
confusion with a plaintiff's vanity telephone number, courts first should
translate the allegedly infringing number into its most confusingly similar
form-either numeric or alphanumeric-for comparison purposes, re-
gardless of whether it was advertised in that form.- Courts should then
apply the eight traditional "likelihood of confusion" factors to determine
if a violation will result.3' When applying four of these factors-the
strength of the plaintiff's mark, the similarity of the marks, the related-
ness of the services, and the likely degree of purchaser care and sophisti-
cation-a court should pay special attention to the unique factual issues
inherent in a trademark infringement case involving vanity telephone
numbers. These unique factors are discussed below.
1. Strength of the Plaintiffs Mark
One of the most important considerations in determining whether in-
fringement of a protected trademark has occurred is the "strength" of
the plaintiffs mark.2 3 ' The term "strength" refers to the distinctiveness
of the mark and its tendency to identify a product or service with a par-
233. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1938) (establishing
this remedy for generic marks).
234. See infra Part III.A.2 (concluding that a number should be analyzed determined
on how the public is dialing the number).
235. The factors are:
(1) strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) relatedness of the services; (3) similarity
of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6)
likely degree of purchaser care and sophistication; (7) intent of the defendant in
selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines using the
marks.
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 770 (1997) (citing Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d
642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982)). The Sixth Circuit never applied these factors because it con-
cluded that, on its face, the contested telephone number was not similar to Holiday Inns's
protected vanity telephone number, "1-800-HOLIDAY." See id. at 626.
The factors the Second Circuit applies are: strength of the plaintiff's mark; similarity
between the marks, product relationship; actual confusion; good faith, purchaser sophisti-
cation; defendant's product quality; and the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the
gap. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
The Ninth Circuit applies between five to eight factors in its cases. See 1 GILSON &
SAMUELS supra note 24, § 5.01[31[i], at n.19; see also Kelley Blue Book v. Car Smarts,
Inc., 802 F. Supp. 278, 284-88 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (applying the "likelihood of confusion"
factors to the facts of the case).
236. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 11:2.
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ticular source. 7 Factors affecting the strength of a mark include, but are
not limited to, the potential for exhaustion of trademark alternatives for
competitors,238 and the existence of a "crowded market" in which nu-
merous similar trademarks are used by various competitors.
2 9
With respect to vanity telephone numbers, the potential for exhaustion
of the total available supply is a significant consideration which should
weigh heavily against a finding that a term in a vanity telephone number
constitutes a "strong" trademark.2 ° Vanity telephone numbers are lim-
ited to seven digits or characters.24 ' Because there are no letters associ-
ated with the digits "0" and "1" on a telephone keypad, true vanity tele-
phone numbers may only contain the numbers 2 through 8.242 Therefore,
of the eight million number combinations possible in the "800" code,
only 2,097,152 letter combinations can be created.243 Because the over-
whelming number of letter combinations are not words, the available
number of vanity telephone numbers is relatively small.
244
The Third Circuit, in Dranoff-Perlstein, suggested that, because of the
limited range of terms that could be contained within telephone num-
bers, any terms that could be commonly used by others to describe their
products or services should not be protected.24 The court reasoned that
if such terms were protected, others would be provided with an unfair
competitive advantage, and the generic doctrine would be violated. 
2
1
This level of scrutiny should continue to be applied to vanity telephone
numbers in order to protect competitors with the same goods or services.
237. See McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979)
(citing E. I. DuPont DeMemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 393 F. Supp. 502, 512
(E.D.N.Y. 1975)). The modern RESTATEMENT OF UNFAIR COMPETITION also treats
"distinctiveness" and "strength" as synonyms. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 21, at 232 (1995) ("The distinctiveness or 'strength' of a mark measures
its capacity to indicate the source of the goods or services with which it is used.").
238. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 7:39-7:41 (discussing trademark depletion
theory as applied to single color marks).
239. See id. § 11:85.
240. See Dranoff-Perlstein Assocs. v. Sklar, 967 F.2d 852, 855 n.6. (3d Cir. 1992).
241. See id.
242. See Comments of TLDP, supra note 195, at 3.
243. See id.
244. See id. TLDP argued that less than 200,000 are viable vanity telephone numbers.
See id.
245. Dranoff-Perlstein, 967 F.2d at 859-60 (defining a term as generic if it related to
"some distinctive characteristic" of a product or service).
246. See id. at 860.
1997] 1239
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:1199
2. Similarity of the Marks
Another factor that warrants particular consideration in a comparison
of vanity telephone numbers is the similarity of the marks.4 In a "likeli-
hood of confusion" analysis, a court should translate an allegedly in-
fringing number into its most confusingly similar form, either numeric or
alphanumeric, regardless of whether it was advertised as such, so that it
may be properly compared with a plaintiff's vanity number. 24' If a court
finds that the public dials a defendant's telephone number using the let-
ters on the keypad, rather than the numbers, and those letters spell a
word that may violate a plaintiff's trademark, the defendant should be
made to defend the confusingly similar use of the alphanumeric form of
its telephone number.
249
As a guideline for determining similarity of telephone numbers courts
should apply a two-prong test: (1) whether the public is dialing the alleg-
edly infringing mark in its numeric or letter form, and (2) what word or
phrase is spelled by the letters as dialed."' This test should be applied
247. In most cases, this factor involves visual or audible recognition-a consumer sees
or hears the mark and associates it with a label on a package or a sign on a store. See gen-
erally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 23:22-23:25. This recognition can result from the
general appearance of the packaging, the coloring of the label, the words in the slogan, or
an overall mental impression created by a combination of the above. See id. § 23:25.
248. Cf. Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888) (translating foreign words into
English). Similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression be-
tween disputed marks are the most important factors in "the likelihood of confusion"
analysis. See Kellogg Co. v. Pack'em Enterprises, Inc., 951 F.2d 330, 332-34 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (upholding a decision based on the single factor of similarity of marks); supra note
174 & infra note 249 (discussing other factors used by courts to determine whether there
has been an actionable likelihood of confusion).
249. In cases where a challenged trademark is neither visually nor phonetically similar
to the plaintiff's mark, a court is still required to consider whether "the 'psychological im-
agery evoked by the respective marks' may overpower the respective similarities or dif-
ferences in appearance and sound." 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:26, at 23-60 to 23-
61 (quoting Vornado, Inc. v. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co., 390 F.2d 724, 728 (C.C.P.A. 1968)
(Smith, J., dissenting)). Additionally, courts routinely examine the phonetic characteris-
tics of visually distinguishable trademarks. For example, "SO" was found to be confus-
ingly similar with "ESSO." Esso, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F.2d 1, 5-7 (8th Cir. 1938).
In examining the phonetic similarities of trademarks, courts are required to determine
how the average purchaser might pronounce the word rather than how the defendant be-
lieves the word should be pronounced. See J. B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics,
Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 193 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that it was error to assume that Americans
would pronounce "LE CONTE" in the French manner with the accent on the final sylla-
ble making it distinguishable from "CONTI"). Courts also consider whether a picture
mark may be confusingly similar with a trademark protected word, such as in the case of
Mobil Oil's "flying horse" design mark which was found to be infringed by the word mark
"Pegasus." See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-60 (2d Cir.
1987).
250. See supra notes 168 and 169 (discussing that courts should rely on how the public
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regardless of the manner in which the defendant advertised the num-
ber!l1
This principle is analogous to the treatment of a challenged mark that
is alleged to be a foreign translation of a protected trademark 2 The
foreign equivalents doctrine requires a court to translate the challenged
mark into English in order to fully assess the likelihood of confusion. 5
The pronunciation, translation, and mental impression produced by a
trademark are also important factors in determining consumer recogni-
tion of the mark . If any of these factors are ignored, a court may
overlook the reason why consumers chose one product or service over
another, which could lead to an incorrect determination because war-
ranted protection would be withheld.l 5 Likewise, an injustice will be
done if a court refuses to translate a defendant's telephone number into
its alphanumeric form after it has been demonstrated that the defendant
is profiting solely from the misdialing by the public of the plaintiff's van-
ity telephone number5 6
perceives a mark rather than the court's own perception).
251. But see Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997) (requiring a defendant to advertise or actively
promote a vanity number in order for there to be an infringement).
252. See supra note 172 (discussing cases where courts translated foreign words into
English to perform a likelihood of confusion analysis).
253. See Menendez, 128 U.S. at 520; see also 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:36
(discussing the foreign equivalents doctrine).
254. See supra notes 174 and 249 (discussing other factors used by courts to determine
whether there is a likelihood of confusion between two marks). A classic example is the
finding that "TORNADO" fences infringed the trademark of "CYCLONE" fences be-
cause the similarity of the terms was "confusingly similar" when taking into consideration
the fact that both marks were used to sell wire fencing. See Hancock v. American Steel &
Wire Co., 203 F.2d 737, 739-40 (C.C.P.A. 1953). In terms of vanity telephone numbers,
the problem of "confusingly similar" terms could result in even more damages because of
the amount of money at stake. See Comments of Dial-A-Mattress, supra note 3, at 1;
Comments of 1-800-FLOWERS, supra note 2, at 3-4.
An analogous situation would be the similarity of sound. For example, a court found
the name of an insecticide inappropriate because it was too similar to the name of another
insecticide. American Cyanamid v. United States Rubber Co., 356 F.2d 1008, 1009
(C.C.P.A. 1966). The court found that even minor confusion resulting from a misunder-
standing of which insecticide was meant to be applied on a field could result in tremen-
dous damage. See id.
255. See supra note 174 (discussing situations where courts have dealt with confus-
ingly similar marks).
256. See generally Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997). Cf American Cyanamid, 356 F.2d at 1009
(finding likelihood of confusion existed between pesticides "PHYGON" and "CYGON,"
because at a verbal level a mistake or confusion could result in damage to crops).
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3. Relatedness of the Products or Services
Equally important are similarities between the vanity number holders'
products or services."7 This is because if the services or products of van-
ity telephone number holders are the same, there is a great danger that
the public will be confused.2" For example, if two companies use the
"800" numbers O-P-E-R-A-T-O-R and O-P-E-R-A-T-E-R, confusion
will be largely nonexistent if one of the vanity telephone numbers is used
by a trucking company to solicit complaints about its drivers and the
other is used by a telephone company. Inevitably, callers seeking to con-
tact the telephone company will accidentally dial the trucking company
number, but the harm to the telephone company's business will be
minimal since the callers will realize the mistake and correct it.
If, however, the second user of a similar vanity number provides iden-
tical or related products or services as the first user, the likelihood of
confusion will be significant."' Consumers that misdial a company's
number and are connected with a competitor offering the same type of
goods or services may stay on the line and purchase that item from the
junior user.2 ° Thus, in cases involving vanity telephone numbers, the
relatedness of the products or services should weigh heavily in deter-
mining liability.
4. The Likely Degree of Purchaser Care
A fourth factor that should receive special consideration in the likeli-
hood of confusion analysis is the likely degree of purchaser care or cus-
tomer sophistication.26 This factor pertains to the type of product sold
and the identity of the prospective purchaser.262 Other relevant consid-
erations, include the conditions under which the product is usually pur-
chased.263 Competing grocery products, for example, are closely stacked
257. See CHARLES E. McKENNEY AND GEORGE F. LONG, III, FEDERAL UNFAIR
COMPETITION: LANHAM ACT § 43(A) § 3.08[81 (1989).
258. See id
259. See id.
260. This was the result in Holiday Inns. The defendants profited from the fact that
customers misdialed Holiday Inns's number, but often stayed on the line to reserve a
room from the defendants rather than re-dialing Holiday Inns. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d
at 621.
261. See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, §§ 23:92-23:99 (discussing different
levels of purchaser care that courts have examined in a likelihood of confusion analysis).
262. See id.
263. See 1 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 24, § 5.08[2]-[4], at 5-130 to 5-135 (dis-




on crowded shelves, while luxury cars are displayed in spacious dealer-
ships. When a trademark infringement case involves a sophisticated pur-
chaser, who could be presumed to have made a deliberate selection by
differentiating between trademarks, less concern arises that the con-
sumer will inadvertently be confused by a somewhat similar trademark.6
Thus, less trademark protection is needed in these cases.
The likely degree of purchaser care is a particularly important factor
with respect to products and services sold by way of vanity telephone
numbers.265 Consumers do not engage in careful deliberation when di-
aling telephone numbers, or in ascertaining whether the business an-
swering the telephone call was the one they intended to contact. The ex-
266
tent of misdirected business caused by dialing mistakes is tremendous.
In fact, many companies that use vanity numbers, as a matter of practice,
reserve each of the nearly identical numbers that may be called through
a minor misdialing of the advertised telephone number. 67 The fact that
companies may not, or are unable to, reserve numbers complementary to
their own, combined with the public's demonstrated habit of misdialing
numbers, necessitates that courts give great weight to the issue of pur-
chaser care and sophistication when considering a vanity telephone
268number case.
In conclusion, a proper application of the "likelihood of confusion"
factors is necessary to maintain consistent trademark protection for van-
ity telephone numbers.2 69 Trademark policy provides businesses with in-
centives to develop distinctive marks to describe their products and
promote goodwill. 27 Granting appropriate trademark protection to tele-
phone vanity numbers will encourage businesses to develop clever vanity
264. See Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 832 F.2d
1317, 1323 (2d Cir. 1987).
265. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the likelihood of confusion analysis).
266. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 770 (1997).
267. See id.
268. See supra Part II.A.3. On a touch-tone telephone, misdialing can be as simple as
depressing one of the numbers adjacent to a correct number. Misdialing can also occur if
a person transposes the letter "i" with the numeral one or the letter "o" with the numeral
zero. This type of situation occurred in Holiday Inns, where the letter "o" in 1-800-
Holiday was misdialed by the public as a zero. See Holiday Inns, 86 F.3d at 621.
269. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, § 23:19, at 23-42 to 23-44 (discussing the tradi-
tional factors in a likelihood of confusion analysis).
270. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (con-
cluding that the function of a trademark was "to designate the goods as the product of a
particular trader and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his").
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numbers to increase business and profits."1 Consumers will also benefit
from the ability to rely on recognized goodwill and engage in repeated
business transactions with companies that they trust.
B. The FCC Should Refrain from Regulating Vanity Telephone
Numbers
In light of the ability of trademark law to adequately protect vanity
telephone numbers,"' the FCC should not have injected itself into the
regulation of vanity telephone numbers.73 Ostensibly, one of the FCC's
primary purposes in regulating vanity telephone numbers was to prevent
premature depletion of numbers in new toll-free codes set for re-
lease274-- clearly an appropriate FCC function. 275 The Commission also
indicated that it sought to ensure allocation of toll-free numbers "on a
fair, equitable, and orderly basis." '276 While the FCC has the authority to
properly allocate telephone numbers, it does not have the authority to
draft new trademark law or inject itself into the field of trademark law.277
FCC action to protect "800" vanity telephone numbers has distorted
278competition. Many companies that were waiting for the issuance of a
new code in order to gain the competitive marketing advantages that ge-
neric vanity telephone numbers provide, were told by the FCC that they
would not have an opportunity to reserve certain vanity telephone num-
271. Cf. id. at 97-98 (stating that trademark rights are devices designed to protect
against unfair competition by distinguishing goods as those belonging to a specific trader,
and thus protecting that trader's goodwill in his goods).
272. See supra Parts II.A & III.A (arguing that appropriate protection for vanity tele-
phone numbers can be provided by a proper application of trademark principles).
273. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496.
274. See NPRM, supra note 1, at 13694-95.
275. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 201-05, 218 (1994). The Communications Act gives the
FCC authority to regulate the operation of telecommunications common carriers. See id.;
supra note 12 (discussing the FCC's authority).
276. NPRM, supra note 1, at 13692.
277. See, e.g., Comments of Bell Atlantic, supra note 210, at 7-8 ("There is no reason
for the Commission to try to use the Communications Act and its power to regulate com-
mon carriers to constrain the conduct of telephone service customers.., it would be in-
appropriate for the Commission to attempt to do so."); Comments of CTA, supra note 18,
at 13 (stating that trademark law was sufficient to protect vanity telephone number hold-
ers and "[t]he Commission should not act to hinder the development of law in this area");
Comments of Paging Network, supra note 210, at 13-14 (asserting that existing remedies
in trademark law exist for vanity telephone number holders).
278. Generic terms in vanity telephone numbers should not be withheld from the
public or potential competitors of a business. See supra note 39 (discussing that the law
does not provide protection to generic terms).
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bers in the new "888" code, and possibly would not be permitted to do so
in the future.2 9
To correct the competitive imbalance that has resulted, the FCC
should immediately make available all of the vanity telephone numbers
in the new "888" code7m These numbers should be made available ei-
ther through a traditional, first-come, first-serve basis, or through a lot-
tery or auction, if such an approach is more manageable."' Such a sys-
tem will give all parties a fair opportunity to obtain valuable toll-free
vanity telephone numbers.2 2
IV. CONCLUSION
Existing trademark principles are adequate to protect vanity telephone
numbers as trademarks and to protect against trademark infringement
and unfair competition. The application of the law by courts to vanity
telephone numbers, however, has been inconsistent and often inappro-
priate. Although courts have determined that vanity telephone numbers
can be protected as trademarks, there have been judicial decisions giving
generic terms, which should never be protected, full trademark protec-
tion. In other cases, trademark-protectable vanity telephone numbers
have been given inadequate protection against a competitor's use of a
same or confusingly similar number. Nonetheless, a proper application
of trademark law, taking into account the unique factors of vanity tele-
phone numbers, should remedy past judicial mistakes. Additionally, de-
279. See Order, supra note 1, at 2496 (withholding vanity telephone numbers in the
new codes from the public and stating that it would later resolve whether permanent
regulation would be needed).
280. See, e.g., Comments of Bell Atlantic, supra note 210, at 7-8 (arguing against right
of first refusal); Comments of Paging Network, supra note 210, at 13 (same); Comments
of Southern New England Telephone, supra note 210, at 6 (same); Comments of South-
western Bell, supra note 210, at 17 (rejecting right of first refusal).
281. Cf NPRM, supra note 1, at 13698-99 (soliciting comments on how the reserva-
tion and assignment process of the new "888" code should be conducted). Additionally,
the White House has proposed that vanity telephone numbers should be auctioned, esti-
mating proceeds to be worth up to $350 million. See Business Digest, BALTIMORE SUN,
Mar. 8, 1996, at 2C. In the past, the FCC has sold "personal communications services"
(PCS) or wireless communications networks for telephones and computers through auc-
tions with great financial success. See Edmund L. Andrews, Winners of Wireless Auction
To Pay $7 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 1995, at D1. One auction held in March 1995
produced $7 billion in revenue for the federal government, and analysts have agreed that
the auction process for PCS has been a success. See id.; Mike Mills, Putting Down a $10
Billion Bet, Winning Bidders for PCS Licenses Have a Big Task: Making a Profit, WASH.
POST, May 7, 1996, at Cl.
282. See supra note 213 (explaining that numbers on a telephone dial pad may spell
many different words that many businesses would want to utilize).
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spite the judicial errors, it was ill-advised for the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to engage in regulation in the issuance of vanity tele-
phone numbers. This is because existing trademark law, properly ap-
plied, is capable of adequately resolving vanity telephone number
disputes since it is designed to take into consideration the unique issues
that vanity telephone numbers present.
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